This is an informal case summary prepared for the purposes of facilitating exchange during the 2025 WIPO IP Judges Forum.
Session 4: Evidence
Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia [2023]: SIA “Demontāža” v SIA “Ēku demontāža”, Case No. C30786621 (SKC-565/2023)
Date of judgment: September 6, 2023
Issuing authority: Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia
Level of the issuing authority: Final Instance (Cassation instance)
Type of procedure: Judicial (Civil)
Subject matter: Trademarks
Plaintiff: SIA “Demontāža”
Defendant: SIA “Ēku demontāža”
Keywords: Infringement, Evidence, Permanent injunction, Trademark
Basic facts: Person A owns figurative trademarks No M 74 149 and No M 75 261, registered for, inter alia, services in Class 37: dismantling of built structures, dismantling and demolition of buildings. The trademarks consist of the word element ‘Demontāža.lv’ and a black image of an excavator within an orange rhombus. Person A had licensed the use of both trademarks to the plaintiff, SIA “Demontāža”, under a license agreement.
On December 1, 2021, SIA “Demontāža” brought an infringement claim, requesting a final injunction and stating that the defendant, SIA “Ēku demontāža”, had been using in the course of trade a confusingly similar figurative sign, consisting of the word element ‘Ēku demontāža. Radām vietu jaunajam’ (‘Dismantling of buildings. Creating space for the new’) and an image of a black dismantling machine inside a yellow rhombus. On September 2, 2021, before starting the court proceedings, the plaintiff sent a warning letter to the defendant, to which the defendant replied in October 2021, stating that it undertakes to change its sign as far as the use of the rhombus is concerned. However, this change was not made until the filing of the claim (December 1, 2021).
The defendant did not acknowledge the claim, stating, inter alia, that it had changed its sign before the claim was filed.
Both the Court of the First Instance and the Court of Appeal concluded that the infringement had been remedied before the date of the first hearing (June 6, 2022), yet the parties had a dispute over when the use of the defendant’s sign was stopped – before or after the action had been brought. The Courts dismissed the claim, considering that the plaintiff had failed to prove the existence of an infringement at the time when the action was brought. At the same time, the Court of Appeal excluded from evidence the printouts and screenshots of the defendant’s Facebook page and the defendant’s website submitted by the plaintiff, which showed that the disputed sign was still used on the defendant's machinery in February 2022. The Court considered the printouts and screenshots to be inadmissible evidence, the veracity of which was contested by the defendant.
Held: The Supreme Court revoked the Court’s judgment and sent the case back to the Court of Appeal for re-examination.
Relevant holdings in relation to evidence: The Supreme Court held that the Riga Regional Court (the Court of Appeal) had incorrectly applied Article 95 of the Civil Procedure Law on admissibility of evidence and Article 178 on contesting the veracity of written evidence. The Supreme Court held that printouts and screenshots of websites fall within the concept of written evidence and are admissible evidence. The Supreme Court determined there was no reason to declare the printouts and screenshots inadmissible on the ground that they are not secured by the bailiff.
As regards the veracity of written evidence, the Supreme Court pointed out that the absence of other evidence is not in itself a basis for establishing that the submitted evidence is false. The burden of proof (onus probandi) of the veracity of the written evidence is primarily on the party who brings that piece of evidence in the dispute. However, for this party to be able to fulfill this duty, the other party, when disputing the veracity of the evidence, must indicate the reasons that may justifiably (reasonably) raise doubt about the veracity of the said piece of evidence.
The Supreme Court also explained the principles of evaluating the veracity of a file. In particular, if the veracity (authenticity) of a file as written evidence is disputed, the Court must examine its metadata, which provide information about the file, including the time of its creation. The Court must evaluate whether the metadata are sufficient to support a decision that the submitting party has fulfilled its initial duty of proof. If so, the burden of proof shifts to the other party, who, disputing the veracity of the file, must prove its arguments.
For example, if the veracity of the date of creation of a file is questioned, the Court, when assessing metadata, must consider, inter alia, whether it is technically feasible to alter the evidence in the alleged way and whether the party submitting the evidence could be interested in misrepresenting the relevant date in the specific way in the particular circumstances of the case.
The Supreme Court also held that the Riga Regional Court was wrong in holding that the applicant must prove the exact period of time of the infringement in order to request a final injunction. The Supreme Court explained that establishing the period during which the infringement took place is usually required where damages are claimed, as the duration of the infringement is a criterion that may play a role in assessing the extent of the damage suffered. However, in order for a final injunction to be imposed, it is necessary to establish the existence of an infringement (or of a preparatory action in the case of an alleged future infringement), but not its duration.
Relevant legislation: Arts. 54(1)(1), 55 of the Latvian Law on Trademarks; Arts. 95, 178 of the Latvian Civil Procedure Law.