This is an informal case summary prepared for the purposes of facilitating exchange during the 2025 WIPO IP Judges Forum.
Session 6: Personality rights
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic [2025]: Milion Chvilek, z. s. v Dr. V. F., Case No. Pl. ÚS 26/24
Date of judgment: January 15, 2025
Issuing authority: Constitutional Court
Level of the issuing authority: Final Instance
Type of procedure: Judicial (Constitutional)
Subject matter: Other
Plaintiff: Million Chvilek, z. s.
Defendant: Dr. V. F.
Keywords: legal entity, civil association, personality right, defamation, non-economic harm, right to fair satisfaction, letter of apology, civil law, constitutional law, natural law
Basic facts:
The plaintiff is a legal entity (a private association) actively involved in politics. The defendant is a well-known politician. In the proceedings, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had made false and defamatory denunciations about it, thereby causing it non-economic harm. The plaintiff sought compensation for such harm and claimed that the defendant be ordered to send the plaintiff a letter of apology. The core issue in the proceedings was whether the recent Czech legislation grants legal entities the private right to compensation for non-economic harm caused by defamation.
Reviewing the lower courts' dismissive judgments, the Supreme Court referred to its pilot decision of November 30, 2021, Case No. 23 Cdo 327/2021, in which it concluded that the recent Czech law does not grant legal entities the private right to compensation for non-economic harm caused by defamation. This is due to the recodification of private law effective since 2014, where the Civil Code in Art. 2894(2) expressly provides that all harmed subjects are entitled to compensation for non-economic harm (in addition to the general right to compensation for economic harm) only if this is expressly provided for by legislation. For legal entities, this right is expressly provided in a variety of situations (including infringement of intellectual property rights). However, according to the wording of the Civil Code, it is perfectly evident that the law does not expressly grant legal entities (unlike human beings) such a right in situation of defamation alone (Art. 135 of the Civil Code).
Therefore, the Supreme Court further assessed whether the law might contain an unintentional legislative gap in this regard. It took into account the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the recent Civil Code, the preparatory legislative materials, the content of the explanatory memorandum, the subsequent amendment efforts, the historical development of the issue in the territory, the relevant theory opinions, as well as the recent fictitious character of legal entities being a mere legal economic construct dependent on the content of the legislation, as a result of which the recognition of non-economic harm of legal entities is (unlike human beings) also a part of such a legislative fiction. It finally concluded that there is no unintentional gap in the Civil Code, so that the legislature clearly intended not to grant this right to legal entities.
The Supreme Court also considered whether this right might derive directly from the constitutional framework irrespective of the wording of the Civil Code. For this purpose, it made a review of international and EU law (incl. the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) and of the content of academic unification projects (incl. the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) and the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL)). It also obtained a comparative analysis of how this issue has been handled in related European jurisdictions (incl. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy and Slovenia). The Supreme Court then found that such a right of legal entities is not generally recognized as a fundamental (natural) right and therefore, it cannot derive directly from the constitutional framework (incl. Art. 10 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, hereinafter referred to as the “Charter”) since it is not a right safeguarded by international human rights conventions, such a right is not granted to legal entities in the variety of examined jurisdictions, and certainly is not a fundamental (natural) right.
For these reasons, the Supreme Court concluded that for the protection of legal entities against defamation, the Civil Code grants them the right to claim injunctions, corrective measures, and general (tort) right to compensation for economic harm and for unjust enrichment. However, the recent legislation does not entitle legal entities to enforce compensation for non-economic harm from defamation against other private subjects.
Held:
The Constitutional Court overruled the opinion of the Supreme Court and, consequently, revoked the Supreme Court´s decision.
The Constitutional Court held that the effective protection of the reputation of legal entities is safeguarded by Art. 10(1) of the Charter and requires the analogous applying of the remedies available in case of unfair competition, including the right to fair satisfaction.
Five judges published the dissenting opinion affirming the findings of the Supreme Court.
Relevant holdings in relation to Personality rights:
The Constitutional Court proceeded, inter alia, from a comparative analysis and an analysis of international and EU law (including the case law of the ECHR and the ECJ).
It found that in the legal systems of most of the compared countries, legal entities enjoy the same personality rights as human beings - with the exception of those related to the biological nature of human beings. Not all comparing countries make a clear distinction between economic and non-economic harm. The right of legal entities to fair satisfaction in respect of all forms of harm (economic and non-economic) or unjust enrichment is granted in most countries. In some countries, legal entities can obtain apologies, in others monetary compensation. Some countries grant the right to revocation. In some countries there are recent trends in case law to strengthen the option for legal entities to claim compensation for non-economic harm. Other countries grant a very limited protection for the reputation of legal entities; in some of them monetary compensation with an emphasis on economic harm prevails. The ECHR has so far expressly left open the question of whether the private life protected under Art. 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( Convention) involves the reputation of legal entities. In the context of the interpretation of Art. 10 of the Convention, the ECHR pointed out that the nature and scope of the right of legal entities to their reputation are disputable. In EU law, the right to compensation for non-economic harm caused by defamation of legal entities is not generally unified or harmonised.
In this respect, the Constitutional Court ruled that legal entities are generally entitled to the protection of their reputation as a fundamental right under Art. 10(1) of the Charter and that they may suffer economic and non-economic harm resulting from defamation.
Such fundamental right includes the obligation of the State to ensure effective remedies for legal entities against defamation caused by both governmental bodies (vertical action) and private subjects (horizontal action). For that purpose, the particular remedies, i.e. injunctions and corrective measures, or right to compensation for economic harm and for unjust enrichment are not sufficiently effective, especially in the recent digital, “fast and shared” era in which information can be freely disseminated instantly and on a mass scale via the Internet and social networks at minimal costs. Moreover, for many legal entities, it might be very difficult or impossible to quantify the economic loss of profit or reduction of property as a result of defamation. Thus, although the harm caused by defamation of a legal entity may have particular economic consequences, it is typically considered as non-economic harm, which is compensated by fair satisfaction. Therefore, the incapacity of legal entities to claim fair satisfaction for non-economic harm constitutes a legal restriction of their fundamental right to the protection of their reputation since other remedies are not sufficiently effective for such a protection, which cannot be considered adequate.
Subsequently, the Constitutional Court assessed whether such a legal restriction of the fundamental right should lead to the abrogation of the relevant part of the Civil Code or whether it can be overcome by its constitutionally coherent interpretation. It held that it is not apparent from the available records that the Parliament had a clear intention to deprive legal entities of the right to compensation for non-economic harm caused by defamation. Therefore, the absence of an express provision in the Civil Code allowing legal entities to claim such a right constitutes an unintentional gap in the law, which is necessary to be overcome by the analogous applying of the same catalogue of remedies as that provided for protection against unfair competition in Art. 2988 of the Civil Code, since the nature and consequences of defamation are similar both within and outside the context of unfair competition. It involves also the right of legal entities to compensation for non-economic harm by providing them with fair satisfaction, even in the form of monetary compensation.
Relevant legislation:
Civil Code, Art. 2894(2): If the duty to provide compensation to another for non-economic harm has not been expressly stipulated, it affects the tortfeasor only where specifically provided by a statute. (unofficial translation)
Civil Code, Art. 135(1),(2): A legal person which has been affected by having its right to a name disputed or which has suffered harm due to unlawful interference with that right, or which is under threat of such harm, in particular by unauthorised use of the name, may claim that such unlawful interference be refrained from and the corrective measures applied.
A legal person enjoys the same protection against anyone who, without a lawful reason, interferes with its reputation or privacy, unless for artistic or scientific purposes or for print, radio, television or similar coverage; however, neither such an interference may be in conflict with the legitimate interests of the legal person. (unofficial translation)
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, Art. 10(1): Everyone has the right to demand that his human dignity, personal honour, and good reputation be respected, and that his name be protected. (unofficial translation)
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Arts. 8, 10