Date of
Judgment: March 15, 1988
Issuing
Authority: Supreme
Court
Level of
the Issuing Authority: Final Instance
Type of
Procedure: Judicial
(Civil)
Subject
Matter: Copyright and Related
Rights (Neighboring Rights)
Main
text of the judgment (decision):
1. The part of the present jokoku appeal in relation to the judgment of the original
instance court concerning the claim for compensation by the jokoku
appellee on the ground of an infringement of the right of performance by
singing accompanied by the karaoke play shall be dismissed on substantive
grounds.
2. The remaining part of the
appeal shall be dismissed on procedural grounds.
3. The cost of appeal shall
be borne by the jokoku appellant.
Reasons:
On
the ground of judgment by the representative for the jokoku
appeal, Chiharu Abe:
According
to the facts lawfully ascertained by the original instance court, the jokoku appellants installed in the snack bars jointly owned
by the appellants karaoke equipment and karaoke tapes in which copyrighted
musical pieces which the jokoku appellees manage by
having the copyright and the performing rights derived from the copyright
transferred by the holder of the copyright for trust management. There,
hostesses and other employees of the snack bar operated the equipment, gave
customers an indexed list of musical pieces, handed them a microphone and
encouraged them to sing, and made the customers sing in the presence of other
customers accompanied by the music recorded in the karaoke tape. They often
made the hostesses sing alone or together with the customer, and thus enhanced
the lively atmosphere of the snack bar with the intention of collecting
customers and increasing profit. Under such circumstances, not only in cases
where the hostesses sang, but also when the customers sang, the subject entity who
used the copyrighted music by performance (singing) was the jokoku
appellants, and the performance was in public and for profit
making purposes. This is because it is evident that the singing by the
customers and hostesses was intended for the public to listen to directly
(Art.22, Copyright Law), and even when only the customers were singing, they
were not singing without the involvement of the appellants; through the
soliciting by the employees of the appellants of customers to sing, the choice
of music within the scope of the karaoke tape provided by the appellant, the
operating of the karaoke equipment by the employees, the customers are
understood to have been singing under the management of the appellants. On the
other hand, the appellants accepted singing by customers as part of the snack
bar's business strategy and by using this, enhanced the atmosphere as a karaoke
snack bar, and also intended to attract customers who
prefer such an atmosphere and thus increase profit. Thus, the singing by
customers as indicated above can be seen as equivalent to the appellants
themselves singing from the viewpoint of the regulation of the Copyright Law.
Therefore,
the appellants have infringed the performing rights which are derived from the
copyright on the musical work by allowing the hostesses and other employees and
customers to sing, accompanied by the karaoke music[,] the pieces which are
copyrighted works managed by the jokoku appellee
without the consent of the appellee, and cannot be exempted from tort liability
for the infringement of performing rights as a subject entity of the
performance. Although when producing the karaoke tape, fees were paid to the
holder of the copyright, the fees are for allowing the reproduction (recording)
of the copyrighted music and as such, the karaoke tape can be freely replayed
as the reproduction of the lawfully recorded copyrighted music (Copyright Law
before the amendment by Law No.64 of 1986, attached rules Art.14,
Implementation Order of the Copyright Law, attached rules, Art.3), it cannot be
construed that singing by customers accompanied by karaoke, which is a
completely different manner of use of copyrighted music from the replay of a
karaoke tape, should be allowed to be done freely without the consent of the
holder of the copyright, solely because the singing is accompanied by karaoke
which merely has a supplementary role.
The
ruling of the original instance court, which is in line with the above, is
justifiable, and there is no breach of law in the judgment as was argued by the
appellant. The argument of the appellant criticises
the original judgment on grounds different from the above,
and cannot be accepted.
The
appellants have failed to produce a brief which contains the grounds for a jokoku appeal on the part of the judgment of the original
instance court concerning the claim other than the claim on the ground of the
infringement of the performing right by the singing accompanied by karaoke.
Therefore,
by virtue of articles 401,399,399-3, 95,89, and 93 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, except for the opinion of Justice Masami Itoh, the justices
unanimously rule as the main text of the judgment.
The
opinion of Justice Itoh is as follows:
I
concur with the conclusion of the majority opinion which confirmed the judgment
of the original instance court which ruled that the appellants are liable for
the tort of infringing the rights to perform and acknowledged the claim for
compensation of the jokoku appellee based upon tort liability, but cannot concur with the reasoning which leads
to the conclusion on the following grounds.
The
majority opinion, based upon the facts ascertained by the original instance
court that the appellants, in the snack bars which they own, installed karaoke
equipment and tapes, the hostesses and other employees operated the equipment,
gave customers an indexed list of musical pieces, handed them a microphone and
encouraged them to sing, let the customers sing in the presence of other
customers accompanied by the replay of the music recorded in the karaoke tape,
and often made the hostesses sing alone or together with the customer, and thus
enhanced the lively atmosphere of the snack bar with the intention of
collecting customers and increasing profit, ruled that not only in cases where
the hostesses and the others sing, but also in cases where only the customers
sing, the subject entity of the use of the copyrighted music by performance
(singing) is the appellants, who are the entrepreneurs, and because the
performance was for profit making purposes and made in public, the appellants
who failed to obtain the consent of the appellee cannot be exempted from tort
liability for the infringement of the right to perform.
I
have no objection in cases where the hostesses and other employees sing with
karaoke accompaniment, the appellants as entrepreneurs should be regarded as
the subject entity of using the copyrighted music by performance (singing), and
in cases where the hostesses and other employees sing together with customers,
the appellants may also be regarded as the subject entity of using the
copyrighted music by considering the singing of the hostesses and customers as
a whole. However, it is rather unnatural to regard the appellants who are
entrepreneurs as the subject entity of using the copyrighted music when only
the customers sing; as an interpretation, this has gone too far. The majority
opinion, as mentioned above, even in cases where it was only the customers who
sang, took into consideration the solicitation to sing by employees, the choice
of the music within the scope provided by the karaoke tape supplied by the
appellants, along with the operation of the karaoke equipment by the employees,
and concluded that the customers were singing under the control of the
appellants, and on the other hand, found that the appellants accepted the
singing by customers as part of the business strategy and pursued profit, and
thus found the singing by customers to be the equivalent to the singing by the
appellants from the viewpoint of the regulation of the Copyright Law. Even by
taking into account the circumstances such as the solicitation of singing as
referred to in the majority opinion, the customers are not singing on the basis
of employment or work contract with the appellants, or have an obligation
against the appellant to sing; whether to sing or not is entirely left to the choice
of the customers, and the copyrighted music is used by their free will.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellants were actively involved in the
use of the copyrighted music, and the singing by customers should be
distinguished from the singing by hostesses and other employees in relation to
the use of the copyrighted music. Treating the singing of customers as an
equivalent of the singing by the appellant is too fictional and unacceptable.
I
believe that regarding karaoke performance, the matter should be approached not
from the aspect of singing with karaoke accompaniment as above, but by focussing on the karaoke equipment and considering the
replay of the karaoke tape by the karaoke equipment itself as an infringement
of the rights to performance. Article 14 of the Attached Rules to the Copyright
Law (Law No.48, 1970, but before the amendment by Law No.64, 1986; the same in
the following) provides that concerning the replay of the performance of the
copyrighted music which has been lawfully recorded, for the time being, Article
30, para.1. subpara.8 of the previous Copyright Law (Law 1889 Law No.39; the
same in the following) which provided that 'providing for entertainment and
broadcasting the works lawfully copied on the equipment which mechanically
reproduces the sound shall not be deemed as forgery' is applicable except for
the broadcasting, or cable transmission, and profit making business using
copyrighted music which are designated by the cabinet order, and on this basis,
Art. 3, para.1 of the Implementation Order of the Copyright Law lists 'cafes
and other businesses providing food and drinks to customers which advertise as
part of the business that the customers are able to enjoy music, or have a
special equipment installed for the customers to enjoy music' as one of the
designated businesses as mentioned above. The majority opinion seems to
understand that the installed karaoke equipment was not 'special equipment
installed for the customers to enjoy music'. However, karaoke equipment is
special equipment with which, by replaying the karaoke tape, customers sing
directly to the public accompanied by the recorded music, and although the
installation of karaoke equipment with such a purpose may not be a place 'which
has special equipment enabling the customers to enjoy music' per se,
nevertheless should be regarded as something similar, and therefore, for the
replaying of the karaoke tape by karaoke equipment for business purposes, it is
reasonable to understand that Article 30, para.1. subpara.8 of the previous
Copyright Law by Article 14 of the Attached Rules to he
Copyright Law is not applicable. Since, at the time of the enactment of the
Copyright Law, the popularity of karaoke equipment of today was not foreseen,
Art. 3, para.1 of the Implementation Order of the Copyright Law does not have
the wording with karaoke equipment in mind, but in the light of the intention
of the law concerning Article 14 of the Attached Rules and Art. 3, para.1 of
the Implementation Order of the Copyright Law which allowed the application of
the former Copyright Law only to those businesses in which the provision of
music was not directly linked to the profit, the above interpretation is
thought to be in line with such an intention of the law.
(Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London)