INTRODUCTION

Judicial authorities play a pivotal role in the general organization of modern societies. The more that role is efficient, the more stability will prevail and social tensions diminish. Indeed, the role of the judiciary consists in securing respect for and efficient enforcement of, legislation protecting rights and freedoms. It is not sufficient that legislation establishes rights (through substantive provisions) or means for acquiring such rights (through procedural provisions); acquisition of rights, regardless of the means of acquisition, must be guarantied through efficient channels of justice controlled by a solid authority capable of protecting rights against violation or abuse.

* The views expressed in the Study are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Secretariat or of the Member States of WIPO.
Perhaps one of the most important rights for which protection and efficient enforcement must be provided relates to the human intellect: creations and expressions of the mind. Efficient protection of such rights encourages creativity and innovation, promotes development of societies and improves the quality of life. Such rights are commonly called "intellectual property rights" with two categories: industrial and literary.

In Egypt, intellectual property rights are protected by the judiciary which plays an important role in fighting infringements, whether at the civil level (by deciding damages against infringers) or at the criminal level (by deciding deterring sanctions against infringers), in addition to effective preventive measures to preserve evidence of infringement against any tampering.

The Egyptian judiciary has been playing that role even before the domestic legislation on the protection of intellectual property rights was promulgated. The importance of that role is expected to increase in the light of the emphasis put on intellectual property rights in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of which 21 of the 73 Articles (i.e. almost 30% of the provisions) deal with enforcement.

In this paper, Part I will deal with the role of the judiciary in the enforcement of intellectual property rights prior to the promulgation of the Egyptian legislation, Part II with enforcement under the said legislation, and Part III will cover the future role of the judiciary under the TRIPS Agreement.

PART I. ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PRIOR TO LEGISLATION

The Egyptian legislator made the first attempt at regulating industrial property rights, on the aftermath of the abolition of foreign capitulations, in 1939, when Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications was promulgated.

On the other hand, literary and artistic property was dealt with by the Egyptian legislator, for the first time, in 1954, with the promulgation of Law No. 354 of 1954 on the Protection of Copyright.

What was the situation prior to the promulgation of the legislation on intellectual property rights? Was infringement permissible? Was the judiciary unable to prosecute piracy of creations and innovations? Were other means and mechanisms available for the protection and effective enforcement of those rights?

In order to answer the above questions, the judicial system and jurisprudence then existing in the fields of industrial property and copyright, need to be described.

Before the Montreux Treaty was concluded in 1937, foreign capitulations applicable in Egypt extended to the judiciary. While disputes of indigenous litigants were decided by "indigenous courts" disputes involving Egyptians and foreigners were settled by "mixed courts".
Despite the absence of any legislation governing intellectual property rights, whether industrial or literary, indigenous and mixed courts invoked principles of natural law and justice to protect those rights.

**Industrial Property**

The Explanatory Note on Law No. 57 of 1939 states that most civilized countries have enacted legislation governing such protection; the Egyptian penal law provides for a norm protecting industrial property, that forbids imitation of trademarks or sale of goods bearing imitated marks (Indigenous Penal Law, Articles 303 to 306, Mixed Penal Law, Articles 312 to 315). However, the said provisions could not be implemented because no regulations, as referred to under Article 305, Indigenous Penal Law, or Article 314, Mixed Penal Law, were issued. Unable to decide criminal sanctions, indigenous and mixed courts, alike, turned to civil remedies in order to provide adequate protection for industrial property on the basis of principles of natural law and justice.

It is worth noting that the mixed judiciary not only provided protection through dispute settling decisions, but established an administrative system for the registration of trademarks and commercial names, in order to facilitate evidence of ownership and determine priority on the basis of such registration.

Regarding court interpretations in the field of industrial property, a decision rendered by the Mixed Court of Appeal on February 21, 1912, confirmed protection for all categories of industrial property (commercial names, trademarks, patents, industrial designs and any means for attracting clients), asserting that legal protection for the rights of manufacturers was ensured in Egypt by principles of natural law.

In addition to the above-mentioned decision, a brief description of decisions on trademarks by mixed courts is provided here-below.

Possible forms and constituting elements of trademarks include "names represented in a distinctive form". While, as a rule, a name is used to identify a tradesman or establishment, the function of a mark consists in distinguishing a good from other similar goods. However, a name may be legally used as a trademark, provided that it has a distinctive form, except for names of personalities (historical leader, poet, author), which may be used as such, without any distinctive addition or specific form.

Although the above requirements were introduced under Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications, the Mixed Commercial Court of Cairo had confirmed the principle before a legislative text to that effect was enacted: In a decision rendered on April 19, 1920, the said Court ruled that use of a historical image, such as that of Cleopatra, created an exclusive right for the person who used the image to distinguish products.

Such forms of trademarks include drawings represented in a distinctive form. In this case, protection extends to the form as a whole, not the drawing itself. Before such requirement was provided for under the Law on Trademarks and Commercial indications, the Mixed Court of Appeal had established that principle by a decision rendered in February 16, 1921, in which it ruled that a drawing composed of three golden lines printed on cigarette...
paper may be registered as a trademark provided that the composition is distinctive and attractive.

Distinctiveness as an essential requirement for a trademark to be protected. Article 5, Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications, provides that "[t]he following may not be registered as trademarks or component parts of such marks: (a) marks having no distinctive character or such as are simply the description of a product or the picture or ordinary representation of such product".

Consequently, a sign that indicates the nature or utility of a good or service, which merely consists of a generic name used to designate such good or service, may not be registered as a trademark (e.g. "monotype" for monotype machines).

Descriptive signs, which merely indicate the composition of a good or consist of substantial characteristics of a product, may not be registered as trademarks (e.g. a picture of an orange for an orange juice). No tradesman should be entitled to make exclusive use of such descriptive terms.

The Mixed Court of Appeal confirmed the above principle, before the Law was enacted, but allowed protection of such signs if they were represented in distinctive form: It ruled, in a hearing on March 11, 1936, that qualitative or descriptive signs, as such, could not be considered as trademarks, but could become so if they acquired a distinctive form, for instance, by using bold characters in a distinctive manner, specific colors or geometrical forms.

Literary and Artistic Property

While industrial property protection was only ensured at the civil level, due to the fact that provisions of the indigenous or mixed penal laws could not be implemented because no regulations for the implementation of those laws were enacted, the situation was different as far as literary and artistic property was concerned.

Notwithstanding the fact that, in the absence of legal provisions, the same source (principles of natural law and justice) was used by judges of indigenous and mixed courts, alike, for the protection of both industrial and literary property, and the same legal authority (rules on limited responsibility) was used to decide damages against violations of industrial or literary rights, mixed courts, unlike indigenous courts, adopted different positions in the field of industrial property and that of literary and artistic property.

While indigenous courts refused to operate criminal law provisions, on the ground that no criminal responsibility could be determined in the absence of a legislative text on literary and artistic property, mixed courts preferred not to wait for implementing regulations to be enacted. The Criminal Chamber of Cassation, Mixed Court of Appeal, ruled, in a hearing on February 17, 1941, that performance of a song or musical composition, without the authorization of the author or composer, was considered as an offence punishable under Article 351 of the Penal Law. The Chamber further stated that the said Article did not require that any specific condition should be satisfied in order for that Article to be applicable, as opposed to Article 348 which considered printing a book of a third person as criminal imitation that incurred injury for that person, but the application of which required a legislation governing literary property.
Nevertheless, by providing for literary property under Law 354 of 1954, the Egyptian legislator did not create protection from nothing. The Law only confirmed and regulated protection in that branch of intellectual property, which was already protected by court interpretations on the basis of principles of natural law and justice, as asserted by the decision rendered by the Court of Cassation in a hearing on February 25, 1965.

PART II: THE JUDICIARY AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER ENACTED LEGISLATION

As mentioned earlier under Part I, the judiciary, whether indigenous or mixed, protected intellectual property rights, on the basis of principles of natural law and justice, before the relevant legislation was enacted; the provisions of the legislation only confirmed and regulated protection, but did not create it from nothing.

The law-making process started after the foreign capitulations, including those that encompassed industrial* and literary property, were abolished, in 1939 (Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications) with a landmark in 1949 (Law No. 132 on Patents and Industrial Designs) and ended in 1954 (Law No. 354 of 1954 on the Protection of Copyright). As a result, court interpretations increased in the course of enforcement procedures relating to rights under the said legislation, particularly in the field of trademarks and commercial indications (industrial property) and the field of literary and artistic property (copyright). The following pages will deal with that issue.

Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Trademarks and Commercial Indications

1. Article 1 of Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications reads: "… a trade mark shall … include names represented in a special or particular manner…".

It may be concluded that the legislator allowed the tradesman, manufacturer or other person to use their personal names as a trademark for their product or service, provided that such name is represented in a distinctive form, by using particular fonts, lines or forms, that introduce a distinctive characteristic (such as the koufi font or Pharsi characters).

The above conclusion was confirmed by the Court of Cassation, when it decided, on appeal no. 121, in a hearing on December 10, 1959, that it understood that the legislator allowed the tradesman or manufacturer to use their personal name as a distinctive sign with respect to their products, provided that the name be represented in a distinctive form; the legislator also allowed that a mark be composed of words other than personal names. However, a word differed from a name, and should represent a distinctive or innovative designation. It may be concluded that, the legislator did not consider mere names and words as trademarks, which meant that the name of a tradesman used as a trademark was not,

* In the field of industrial property, the legislator generally opted for the creation of quasi judicial committees to consider disputes concerning decisions by administrative authorities, objections to the grant of a patent or registration of a trademark or an industrial design, and opened the way for filing appeals against decisions by such committees before administrative courts of the State Council. The consolidated Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights followed the same path.
according to the text, a mere word, which exempted it from the requirement of a distinctive form.

2. Regarding the very nature of a sign, that makes it capable of distinguishing a given product from other products and protecting the consumer from confusion, the Court of Cassation decided, on appeal no. 2388, in a hearing on April 13, 1964, that, in order to determine whether a sign was distinctive, what needed to be considered was not the composing elements of the sign, but the sign itself as a whole. What counted was not the characters composing a sign, which could exist in another sign, but the general representation that left impression in the mind as a result of the way images and characters were put together and formed a specific sign, regardless of the composing elements or whether the sign shared, with another sign, one or more parts.

3. According to Article 3 of the Law, "the person registering a trademark is presumed to be the sole owner of such trademark"; such ownership may not be challenged, provided that that person "has made an uninterrupted use of such mark for a period of five years from the date of its registration … in the absence of an admitted claim." Regarding that presumption, the Court of Cassation decided, on appeal no. 324, in a hearing on March 15, 1956, that, where a dispute involved two persons none of whom had acquired ownership of the trademark, through use during at least five years, from the date of registration, as provided for by Article 3 of the Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications, ownership devolved on the person who established precedence of use, even if the other person was first to register or apply for the registration of, the mark.

4. Regarding the registration procedure under Article 8 of the Law, the Court decided, on appeal no. 342, in a hearing on March 15, 1956, that Article 8 of the Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications, aimed at setting a regulating norm to be implemented by the administration in the case where two or more persons applied for the registration of identical or nearly identical marks; the norm required that registration be refused until such time as one or other of these persons would have made a renunciation or until a final judgement has been made in the matter.

5. Article 7 of the Law provides that "A mark may only be registered in respect of one or more categories of goods set out in the Regulations hereto." In settling a dispute on similitude or difference between goods belonging to the same category, the Court decided, on appeal no. 342, in a hearing on March 15, 1956, that the court considering the merits of the case was entitled to decide, within its discretionary power, on the extent to which goods belonging to the same category were similar or different, and on conditions and circumstances relating to the goods and producers of such goods, under which protection afforded by the Law for producers and consumers was to be granted or refused.

6. Regarding objection to the registration of a trademark, as provided for by Articles 12 and 13 of the Law, the Court determined, in respect of appeal no. 342, in a hearing on March 15, 1956, the scope in which the provisions of both Articles became operational as that where the dispute involved antecedence in the registration of the mark or any questions relative to the registration procedure, excluding disputes on the ownership of the mark. Moreover, the Court determined, in a decision on appeal no. 390, in a hearing on January 24, 1962, who was meant by "any person concerned" who may object to the registration of the mark, by ruling that, if it appeared from the minutes of the challenged decision that the heirs of the original owner of the trademark were the ones who filed the action, and that the
commercial establishment of those heirs represented a share of the capital of the enterprise under appeal, that enterprise, to which the trademark devolved by virtue of the enterprise contract, was considered, in the meaning of Article 12, "a person concerned".

7. Regarding transfer and pledge of a trademark and procedure for invoking such acts against third parties, as provided for by Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Law, the Court ruled, in respect of appeal no. 101, in a hearing held on June 23, 1955, that, by virtue of Article 18, the legislator prevented transfer, pledge or attachment of a trademark without the goodwill or business, in order to protect the public from being deceived or mislead with respect to the origin of a good; Article 19 of the Law could not be used to allow that a mark be disposed of without the goodwill; it clearly appeared from the provision of the said Article that what the legislator meant was not to disregard what was established in Article 18, but, rather, allow, if so agreed, the sale of a goodwill without the trademark. According to the Court's ruling, the reason for allowing such disposal was that the owner of the goodwill could choose to sell the goodwill, but maintain the trademark in order for the owner to use it, prevent using it or for any other purpose. However, because of the close link between a mark and the business using it, disposal would include, in the absence of such agreement, the goodwill to be disposed of together with the trademark, as part of its accessories.

In appeal no. 390, the Court ruled, in a hearing held on January 24, 1963, that the third party against whom transfer of the ownership of a mark could be invoked only upon recording and publication according to Article 20 of the Law, was that person for whom a material right subject to compensation, was established in respect of the mark concerned.

8. At the criminal level, the Court considered, in appeal no. 1297, in a hearing held on May 4, 1954, as offences under Article 33 of the Law, four criminal acts relating to trademarks: imitation and counterfeit, and fraudulent use, as mentioned under paragraph (1), affixing to products a mark owned by another person, and offering such products bearing a counterfeited or imitated mark; all of which are independent from one another, each having its own characteristics.

9. Regarding imitation or counterfeit of trademarks, the Court ruled, with respect to appeal no. 543, in a hearing held on May 15, 1967, that it was legally established that imitation meant simulation of the general form, rather than details, of a mark as a whole, as it came out from the prominent features of the mark. In appeal no. 1287, the Court ruled, in a hearing held on December 22, 1959, that elements constituting imitation and fraud differed; the material element of imitation was limited to acts of imitation, counterfeit, use, affixation on products, of the mark, in bad faith; or sale or offering for sale, of products bearing an imitated or counterfeited mark. All such acts were independently considered as offences per se, each having its own intrinsic characteristics. On the other hand, the material element of offences under Article 1, Law No. 48 of 1941 on the Repression of Fraud and Deceit, was limited to committing or participating in, acts of deceit, in respect of a given product, against a contractor. It was ruled that an action against imitation of a trademark would only be acceptable if instituted by the owner of the mark against the person who had committed the act of imitation or counterfeit (appeal no. 436, hearing of June 14, 1956).

The Court also ruled that it was established that imitation of a trademark consisted of an act of simulation that created similitude between the original and the imitation. In view of the fact that the challenged decision failed to provide a description of the original mark or the imitation, or indicate similarities, and that imitation was established on the basis of an opinion
by the trademark controller, the Court considered the decision deficient, stating that, for the confirmation of legal facts in a criminal procedure, the judge should rely on evidence considered as satisfactory for the judge; the decision should not be based on the opinion of another person (appeal no. 2206, hearing of March 10, 1969). It was also stated that applicability of a penalty under Article 33 of Law No. 57 of 1939 required, in addition to sale, or offering for sale or distribution, two further elements, the first being counterfeit or imitation, and the second bad faith (appeal no. 1944, hearing of May 24, 1965).

Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in the Field of Literary and Artistic Property

1. **Provisional measures** provide prompt and simple, efficient means against copyright violations. Article 43 of the Copyright Law No. 354 of 1954, notably, provides for such measures, at both criminal and civil levels, in order to ensure effective protection for stakeholders. The said provision maintains some balance between authors and successors in title on one hand, and alleged violators of rights, on the other. If the author or successor in title has the right to request, by petition to the chief justice of the first instance court, that provisional measures be ordered or allowed by order, the legislator makes it possible for the chief justice to require that the claimant (author or successor in title) make an adequate deposit.

It is also legally possible for the person against whom such order is issued to challenge the order either before the chief justice who issued that order or through an appeal on the ground that an order issued upon petition was a judicial decision.

The Court of Cassation had the opportunity to express its position in respect of provisional measures and remedies:

(a) **As far as challenging such order was concerned**, the Court ruled that, although the judge who issued an order of seizure could not, while considering the challenge of that order, touch upon the subject-matter of the right, it should be possible for the same judge to assess the seriousness of the dispute under consideration, so as not to decide on the merits of the case but determine the validity of the requested measure on grounds other than mere suspicion (cassation hearing, December 6, 1962).

(b) **As far as appeal was concerned**, the Court ruled that the decision on the challenge was not a mere "amicable" decision, but a judicial decision by virtue of which the judge who issued the order superseded the court of first instance; that was why the decision of the Chief Justice on the challenge was appealable before the Court of Appeal. However, according to the Explanatory Note on Law No. 354 of 1954, the Chief Justice of the Court of First Instance acted on challenges as *juge des référés*; but such quality was not compatible with the provisions of the Law, which, in conformity with the general principles governing orders on petition, implied that the mandate entrusted by the legislator with the Chief Justice was of the same nature as that entrusted with the *juge des référés* (cassation hearing, December 6, 1962).

* Provisional measures include (a) detailed description of the work; (b) seizure of the original or copies of the work, and implements that can be used for the republication or reproduction of the same …; (c) establishing public performance in respect of musical performance, drama acting or public disclaim of a work; (d) collecting and seizing proceeds from publication or display.
2. Regarding protection at the criminal level, the Court of Cassation rendered several decisions on imitation offences, particularly concerning the material element and acts constituting imitation.

   (a) As far as what should essentially be taken into consideration in cases of imitation, the Court ruled that what counted in an imitation offence was similitude rather than difference (cassation hearing, November 17, 1988); courts were mandated to bring to the light such imitation: If a court failed to break both seals in order to compare the seized work with the submitted original, the decision would be deficient (cassation hearing, March 4, 1985).

   (b) Regarding imitation offences by way of sale or offering for sale, distribution or rent, knowingly, of an imitated work, as an act in respect of which the material element of imitation is established, and how to assess the extent of knowledge in such cases, the Court ruled that, even if the imitation offence only involved the sale of a work the publication of which was considered as infringement of copyright, without participation by the person who had sold the work in the imitation act, the criminal intention in the case of an imitation offence, which was a deliberate crime, required that the offender had had clear knowledge, when committing the offence, of the elements constituting the offence, which obviously included knowledge by the person who had sold the work of the fact that the work was an imitation (cassation hearing, March 4, 1985).

3. Regarding protection at the civil level, the numerous decisions rendered by the Court of Cassation cannot all be listed in this context; a selection of illustrative examples are given here-below:

   (a) As to whether acts consisting of intellectual participation in the making of a work implied or not joint authorship, the Court ruled, in a hearing on January 4, 1962, in respect of appeal no. 134, that assessment of intellectual participation in the making of a work was a fact-related issue that fell under the exclusive competence of the judge of the merits, in so far as the decision of that judge was based on acceptable grounds; as was concluded in the appealed decision, participation by the appellant in the making of the disputed work was denied, on the ground that evidence submitted consisted of handwritten comments on the original, that, as established by the mandated expert, merely involved replacing a word or example by another, and, as a whole, could not be considered as intellectual participation or exchange of ideas which resulted in the making of the work; the decision was therefore justified.

   (b) Regarding works that fell into the public domain, reediting, republication of, and conditions for acquiring copyright in, such works, the Court found that, as a rule, where compilations of works that had fallen into the public domain after expiration of the protection period, were reedited or republished, the owner of such new edition enjoyed copyright protection only if that new edition differed from the original source, by reason of innovation or arrangement of its contents, or any personal intellectual effort (cassation hearing, July 7, 1964, appeal no. 13).

   (c) Regarding unfair competition resulting from full imitation of a work of authorship, publication of imitated works, and author's right to compensation, the Court ruled that, in view of the fact that the appealed decision concluded that the edition made by the appellant was a full, and hence illegal, imitation of the edition made by the defendant,
publication by the appellant of the edition for selling purposes was clearly an act of unfair competition in respect of the work made by the defendant; the existence of unfair competition could not be denied by the fact that the defendant had closed business and stopped practicing in the field, as long as the imitated work was being offered for sale (cassation hearing, July 7, 1964, appeal no. 14).

(d) Regarding the applicable norm for determining whether a performance was public or not, the Court ruled that what mattered in public performance, in case of playing, acting or disclaiming a protected work, was not the kind of the place where the gathering or concert in which performance took place was held, but the intrinsic characteristics of such gathering or concert; if the gathering or concert was open to the public, performance would be deemed public, even if the place where the gathering was held was considered as private by virtue of its nature or constitution; there was no relationship between the place and the gathering as far as their respective private or public nature was concerned (cassation hearing, February 25, 1965, appeal no. 244).

(e) Regarding economic rights in a work, the Court ruled that the author could transfer to a third party the right of commercial exploitation, which is a material right; insofar as the dispute did not concern the moral right of the author, as provided for by Law No. 354 of 1954, but, rather, the commercial exploitation, with the consent of the author, of a specific number of copies of the work, as permitted by Article 37 of the said Law, there were no grounds for claiming that the decision was in contradiction with Article 5, first paragraph, and Article 38, of the same Law (cassation hearing, May 12, 1966, appeal no. 356).

(f) Regarding the legal status of producers of cinematographic works, the Court ruled that the producer acted on behalf of authors in the exploitation and projection by way of public performance, of the cinematographic work. The scope of representation by the producer extended to the composer of the musical portion of the cinematographic work (cassation hearing, November 8, 1966, appeal no. 495).

However the question as to whether it was admissible to agree otherwise was raised before the Cassation Court, in respect of appeal no. 22. In the hearing held on April 14, 1973, the Court ruled that, in view of the fact that, because of its nature, an artistic work could not be part of a commercial transaction, as was the case of a contract concluded by an artist for the exploitation of the artist’s work, which was considered a civil act, the rules to be applied in that case were those provisions of the civil law on representation; although Article 34 of Law No. 354 of 1954, stipulated that the producer acted on behalf of the authors of the cinematographic work, for publication and exploitation purposes, the last paragraph of the same Article provided for the possibility for an otherwise agreement, which implied that, were the author of the cinematographic work to maintain the right of public performance, the legal representation by the producer would cease to exist and the author would be entitled to exploit the work.

(g) Regarding the right of the author to modify or alter the artistic work, the Court ruled that Article 7 of Law No. 354 of 1954, granted the author the exclusive right to make any modification in or alteration of the work; no other person was allowed to make the same without a written authorization by the author or successor in title; however, the scope of the right enjoyed by the author or successor in title was limited in the case of adaptation and related requirements: If adaptation of the work (e.g. a play for broadcasting purposes) was authorized, the author or successor in title could not oppose such alterations or modifications
as those required for the adaptation of the original work; consent had to be presumed in such case (cassation hearing, January 16, 1979, appeal no. 533).

(h) Regarding the extent to which performance of a recitation of verses of the Holy Koran could be considered an artistic work, the Court ruled, in respect of two famous disputes, that, in the first case, the subject-matter of the contract was not the Holy Koran *per se* nor mere recitation of Koranic verses; what mattered was the voice of the person reciting and extent of public audience: Having surrendered to a third party, the right of commercial exploitation of the performance, the former was not allowed to do anything that could undermine the use by the latter of the right disposed of (cassation hearing, March 12, 1984, appeal no. 555). In the second case, the Court ruled that, if performing a recitation of Koranic verses involved some creativity that made the personality, talent and skill of the performer distinctively apparent, such performance would be considered as an artistic work as stipulated in Article 2 of the Law No. 354 of 1954 (cassation hearing, January 6, 1992, appeal no. 1462).

(i) Regarding the right to claim authorship and mention the name of the author on all copies and advertisements without prior agreement, the Court ruled that, in its first paragraph, Article 9 of the Law No. 354 of 1954, provided that the author had the exclusive right to claim authorship and prevent any infringement of that right. It concluded that the author had always the right to have his or her name mentioned on every copy published by the author or the intermediary of a third person and on all advertisements of the work, without need for an agreement with that other person (cassation hearing, January 7, 1987, appeal no. 1352).

### PART III. THE JUDICIARY AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

As mentioned above, significant importance was attached, in the TRIPS Agreement, to enforcement matters: Not less than 21 (Articles 41 to 61, Part III) out of the 73 Articles (almost 30 percent of the Agreement text) dealt solely with enforcement.

Together with Part V on Dispute Prevention and Settlement, Part IV indeed constitutes an effective protection tool for intellectual property rights.

In this context, two points need to be underlined:

Firstly, it is true that conventions preceding the TRIPS Agreement were not less mandatory or serious; However, the innovation brought about by the TRIPS Agreement is reflected in the comprehensive manner in which both issues of enforcement and dispute settlement are governed and the introduction of specific implementation mechanisms;

Secondly, the comprehensive nature of the TRIPS provisions on enforcement and dispute settlement shows that the selective approach to protection of intellectual property rights can no longer apply, and protection means today, extend to all fields without exception.

As far as enforcement, the subject dealt with in this paper, is concerned, the comprehensive regulatory provisions build on two pivots:
Pivot One: General Principles (Article 41), which are covered by two sorts of provisions:

(a) General obligation that Member States ensure that enforcement procedures are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights; such procedures must be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.

It implies that, while Member States are committed, under the TRIPS Agreement, to provide enforcement procedures, they are free to implement such procedures in accordance with their respective legal systems, but following a number of guiding principles.

(b) Guiding principles for the implementation of the general obligation are presented in the TRIPS Agreement as follows:

(i) Procedures should be fair and equitable, not unnecessarily complicated or costly; they should not entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays;

(ii) Decisions should be in writing and reasoned, public and accessible, and based on submissions to the court;

(iii) An opportunity for appeal against decisions should be allowed.

While providing for the above-mentioned guiding principles, the TRIPS Agreement emphasizes that those provisions do not create any obligation for the State to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of its laws in general.

Two points can and should be concluded from the above:

Firstly, the said guiding principles are general legal principles that can be found in almost any legal system for fair and equitable trials under any judicial regime of whatever nature (be it Roman, common law or other). Similarly, those guiding principles are not new to the legal and judicial systems of Egypt; they clearly appear as a basis underlying both codes of procedure (civil and criminal).

Secondly, there is no need for creating a sui generis form for litigation in the field of intellectual property, as is raised nowadays regarding the necessity to have courts specialized in intellectual property cases. What matters is the existence of trained, specialized judges. Specialization of courts essentially depends on a quantitative criterion which is the distribution of workload. A specialized judge who has benefited from introductory to more advanced training in intellectual property fields and has understood the culture and concepts of intellectual property is more apt to perform better, particularly in (higher or lower) courts of first instance. Having reached that conclusion, the Ministry of Justice of Egypt adopted a rational policy by providing training, through the National Center for Judicial Studies or courses organized by WIPO, to judges, attorneys general and even experts.

* It is needless to say that expertise in intellectual property issues necessitates special training. On that basis, the Ministry of Justice of Egypt has organized special courses for experts to improve awareness in such specialized cases as those of industrial and literary property.
Pivot Two: Fields of Protection

The TRIPS Agreement creates a comprehensive system for all fields of protection, starting from administrative procedures to border measures. Regarding the subject of this paper: Role of the Judiciary in the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, the TRIPS Agreement covers in detail protection through provisional measures (Article 50), administrative procedures (Articles 42 to 48) and criminal procedures (Article 61).

Provisional Measures

The purpose of protection through provisional measures is to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right, and, in particular, (i) to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce, of goods immediately after customs clearance, and (ii) to preserve from tampering relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.

The authority prescribed for the judiciary is limited to: (i) adopting provisional measures inaudita altera parte where appropriate; (ii) requiring from the person requesting the measure to provide any reasonably available evidence supporting the claims, and a security to protect the person against whom the injunction was issued from injury; (iii) without delay, notifying the person against whom the injunction was issued, of the injunction, and allow an opportunity for review before the judicial authority, with a view to decide, within a reasonable period, whether the injunction must be revoked, modified or confirmed; (iv) requiring from the person requesting the measure to initiate proceedings leading to a decision on the merits of the case within a reasonable period (20 working days or 31 calendar days); in the absence of such determination, the injunction would cease to have effect.

It is worth noting that legislation governing intellectual property rights in Egypt, provides for an effective system of provisional and preventive measures, in total conformity with the TRIPS system which, in fact, is an application of the system of injunctions on petition, which has long been part of the Egyptian legal system, and is reflected in the current consolidated law on intellectual property rights.

Protection at the Administrative Level

Means providing the right holder with means for claiming damages to compensate for injuries suffered as a result of any infringement of an intellectual property right, including, in particular, civil action before national courts.

Protection at the administrative level is dealt with under the TRIPS Agreement as follows:

a. Principles: Procedures must be fair and equitable (confrontation of litigants, right to defense and representation, etc.);

b. Evidence: As a rule, evidence must be presented by the claimant; however, the judicial authorities may order that evidence relevant to substantiation of the claims, which lies in the control of the opposing party, be produced;
c. **Damages:** Adequate damages must be paid by the infringer to the injured party, with expenses including attorney's fees, and possible order for the recovery of profits even where the infringer did not knowingly engage in the infringement;

d. **Destruction:** of goods, materials and implements the predominant use of which has been in the creation of the infringing goods;

e. **Informing the right holder:** The infringer may be ordered to inform the right holder of the identity of third persons involved in the production or distribution of the infringing goods;

f. **Indemnification for abuse of measures:** The claimant who has abused enforcement measures, may be ordered to provide to a party wrongfully requested to pay damages, adequate compensation for the injury suffered because of that abuse, including costs and attorney's fees.

There is no doubt as to the fact that the above listed items (a to f) are not foreign to the principles underlying the Egyptian legal system or the rules and code of procedures applied in Egypt. They are typically applied to litigation in general and litigation relating to intellectual property in particular.

**Protection at the Criminal level**

The TRIPS Agreement provides for criminal procedures under Article 61 which establishes an obligation for Member States to apply criminal procedures and penalties in two main fields of intellectual property: (i) registered trademarks, in case of willful imitation, and (ii) copyright, in case of piracy, provided that such acts are committed on a commercial scale.

In addition, the TRIPS Agreement allows the application of criminal procedures and penalties in other fields of intellectual property, provided that the infringement is willful and committed on a commercial scale.

Penalties applicable by the judicial authorities include: imprisonment and/or monetary fines plus seizure of infringing goods, or any implements or materials used in committing the offense, and destruction of infringing goods.

It is worth noting that criminal means for the protection of intellectual property rights are fully integrated in the legal and judicial systems of Egypt. Egyptian legislation governing intellectual property, starting with Law No. 57 of 1939 on Trademarks and Commercial Indications, through Law No. 132 of 1949 on Patents and Industrial Designs, and ending with Law No. 354 of 1954 on the Protection of Copyright, have all provided protection at the criminal level. The abundance of criminal court decisions is reflected in the illustrative cases described above.

It is further worth noting that, convinced of the utility of such an approach and the need for adaptation to the current legal and judicial situation of Egypt, the legislator also provided in the consolidated law on the protection of intellectual property rights, for criminal procedures and penalties, not only for trademarks and copyright, but in all fields of intellectual property.
CONCLUSION

Needless to say that enforcement of intellectual property rights implies providing effective protection for such rights at all levels, whether through preventive measures or civil or criminal procedures.

In that respect, the Egyptian judiciary carried out its mission in a remarkable manner before the promulgation of and under, the legislation governing intellectual property rights. With the expansion of fields to be protected and the obligations of Egypt as a Member State of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the importance of the role of the judiciary, under the TRIPS Agreement and the consolidated Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights is expected to increase.

The fact that the role of the Egyptian judiciary will become more important, does not necessitate a restructuring of the bases and constituent elements of the Judiciary as much as it requires systematic training of judges in various intellectual property fields in order to create generations of specialized judges who have acquired a deep understanding of the intellectual property culture, that can upgrade the performance of the judiciary in that respect.