

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

Richer Sounds Limited v. Jones Jones
Case No. D2026-1688

1. The Parties

The Complainant is Richer Sounds Limited, United Kingdom, represented by Lee & Thompson LLP, United Kingdom.

The Respondent is Jones Jones, United States of America.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <richersoundstech.com> is registered with TuringSign Inc. d/b/a Cosmotown (the "Registrar").

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on April 21, 2026. On April 22, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On April 24, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response, disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (UNKNOWN) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on April 24, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on April 27, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Policy" or "UDRP"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Supplemental Rules").

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on April 29, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was May 19, 2026. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent's default on May 20, 2026.

The Center appointed Andrea Jaeger-Lenz as the sole panelist in this matter on May 26, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

The Complainant is a retailer of consumer electronics and audio equipment established in 1978 in the United Kingdom and operates under the trademark RICHER SOUNDS. The Complainant owns, amongst others, the following trademark registrations for this designation (as per Annexes 1 and 2(a) to the Complaint):

- United Kingdom trademark no. UK00917735283 RICHER SOUNDS (word), registered on January 18, 2019, for goods and services in Classes 9, 18, 25 and 35; and
- European Union trademark no. 017735283 RICHER SOUNDS (word), registered on January 18, 2019, for goods and services in Classes 9, 18, 25 and 35.

The Complainant has been operating its website under the domain name <richersounds.com>, with sales offers and imagery related to consumer electronic and audio equipment goods as well as a retail store locator (as per Annex 5 to the Complaint).

The disputed domain name was registered on January 27, 2026. At the time of filing of the Complaint, it resolved to a website with sales offers and links for consumer electronic and audio equipment products, using identical imagery as found on the Complainant's website (as per Annex 6 to the Complaint).

5. Parties' Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

Notably, the Complainant contends that it owns registered trademarks for the designation RICHER SOUNDS which predate the creation of the disputed domain name. The disputed domain name wholly incorporates this trademark, with the, according to the Complainant, mere addition of the term "tech". The Complainant claims that this term does not change the fact that the trademark RICHER SOUNDS is immediately recognizable within the disputed domain name, all the more as the term "tech" related to the field of business of the Complainant, thus exacerbating the likelihood of confusion by suggesting an official or specialized division of the Complainant.

On the second element, the Complainant argues that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Complainant has not licensed, authorized or otherwise permitted the Respondent to use its trademark or any domain name incorporating its trademark. The Complainant puts forth that the Respondent is not commonly known by the disputed domain name, and the use made by the Respondent is not bona fide use either. The reason for that, so the Complainant contends, being the fact that the website – due to copying of images, layout and visual impression – appears to be a deliberate and deceptive copy of the Complainant's website, which can never constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services.

On the third element, the Complainant claims that the Respondent has registered and is using the disputed domain name in bad faith. The Respondent registered the disputed domain name after the Complainant's trademarks – which the Complainant alleges to be reputed – were registered. Coupled with the Respondent's replicating the Complainant's website, it is, according to the Complainant, inconceivable that

the Respondent registered the disputed domain name without knowledge of the Complainant's website. By using the disputed domain name in the way the Respondent has, the Respondent is, so the Complainant contends, in breach of paragraph 4 (b)(iv) of the Policy by using the disputed domain name to intentionally attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website or other online location by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark, which constitutes use in bad faith.

B. Respondent

The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions.

6. Discussion and Findings

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions ("[WIPO Overview 3.1](#)"), section 1.7.

The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 1.2.1.

The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 1.7.

Although the addition of other terms here, "tech", may bear on assessment of the second and third elements, the Panel finds the addition of such term does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 1.8.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.

Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 2.1.

Having reviewed the available record, the Panel finds the Complainant has established a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Respondent has not rebutted the Complainant's prima facie showing and has not come forward with any relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name such as those enumerated in the Policy or otherwise.

The Panel notes that the website at the disputed domain name mimics the Complainant's official website by using its imagery and a similar colour scheme, which is not a bona fide offering.

The Panel finds the second element of the Policy has been established.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

In the present case, the Panel notes that the Respondent created the disputed domain name, which identically includes the Complainant's trademark combined with the term "tech" indicative of technical products, long after the Complainant's RICHER SOUNDS trademarks were registered. The disputed domain name was then used to resolve to a website mimicking the Complainant's website, which is evidenced by a direct comparison of respective website excerpts as per Annexes 5 and 6.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith, but other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent's registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 3.2.1.

Having reviewed the record, the Panel finds the Respondent's registration and use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith under the Policy. Whether or not the facts presented by the Complainant allow the conclusion of the Complainant's RICHER SOUNDS trademark being reputed, is not material here, given that the circumstances of the case show, as made evident by Annexes 5 and 6 of the Complaint, that the Respondent himself clearly knew of the Complainant's trademark and business which he targeted by the registration and use of the disputed domain name.

The Panel finds that the Complainant has established the third element of the Policy.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name <richersoundstech.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

/Andrea Jaeger-Lenz/

Andrea Jaeger-Lenz

Sole Panelist

Date: June 5, 2026