

## **ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION**

Leather Wallet, LLC v. Miner Bucker  
Case No. D2026-1596

### **1. The Parties**

The Complainant is Leather Wallet, LLC, United States of America (“United States”), represented by Coates IP LLP, United States.

The Respondent is Miner Bucker, United States.

### **2. The Domain Name and Registrar**

The disputed domain name <leatherdesktopapp.com> (the “Disputed Domain Name”) is registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu. (the “Registrar”).

### **3. Procedural History**

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on April 15, 2026. On April 16, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Disputed Domain Name. On April 17, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the Disputed Domain Name which differed from the named Respondent (REDACTED FOR PRIVACY, Whois Privacy Protection Foundation) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on April 17, 2026, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed amended Complaints on April 19, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaints satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on April 22, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was May 12, 2026. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on May 13, 2026.

The Center appointed Lynda M. Braun as the sole panelist in this matter on May 15, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

#### **4. Factual Background**

The Complainant is a Delaware limited liability company that operates in the field of decentralized finance, including providing digital wallet services for management of digital financial assets, tokens and collectables, having launched its service on August 31, 2023, in a desktop app. The Complainant allows its users to receive, send, trade, swap and deploy digital tokens and collectables secured by Bitcoin. Users can also deploy their digital assets in other Web3 apps and use Stacks for deploying assets in smart contracts. In addition to the website, the Complainant also provides a desktop app for Windows, macOS and Linux, and a browser extension for Chrome, Brave, Opera and Edge.

The Complainant owns a registered trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) as follows: LEATHER, United States Registration No. 7,773,523, registered on April 29, 2025, in International Classes 9, 36 and 42. The Complainant also owns registered trademarks for LEATHER in the European Union, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia. The aforementioned trademarks will hereinafter collectively be referred to as the “LEATHER Mark”. The Complainant’s LEATHER Mark has acquired distinctiveness and become a unique identifier that consumers associate with the Complainant’s goods and services.

The Complainant owns the domain name <leather.io>, which resolves to the Complainant’s official website at “www.leather.io”, where it offers its LEATHER-branded digital wallet services.

The Disputed Domain Name was registered on March 27, 2026, after the Complainant began using the LEATHER Mark on August 31, 2023. The Disputed Domain Name resolves to the Respondent’s website that impersonates the Complainant and defrauds users by deceiving them into believing they are setting up a two-factor authentication for their LEATHER digital wallet. The website at the Disputed Domain Name includes a link to set up the two-factor authentication, and the Complainant has provided evidence that the Respondent sends users an email, falsely signed as the “Leather Wallet Team”.

On its website, the Respondent uses the identical LEATHER branding as does the Complainant and copies the Complainant’s language verbatim, as follows: “Leather is a wallet for Bitcoin and Stacks, designed for security, clarity, and growth. Join 100,000+ users on your favorite platform.” The Respondent also uses an identical image of a smartphone screen used by the Complainant on its website, thus using the Complainant’s copyrighted work without authorization. Such fraudulent use of the Disputed Domain Name by the Respondent to create a similar website to that of the Complainant was intended to cause the Complainant’s unsuspecting users to share login credentials to their digital wallets and unwittingly provide access and control of their digital assets to the Respondent, allegedly as part of a phishing scheme. Screenshots of the website at the Disputed Domain Name and the email sent to users arriving at the Respondent’s website were submitted by the Complainant as Annexes to the Complaint.

#### **5. Parties’ Contentions**

##### **A. Complainant**

The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the Disputed Domain Name. Notably, the Complainant contends that:

- the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's LEATHER Mark because the Disputed Domain Name contains the LEATHER Mark in its entirety, followed by the terms "desktop" and "app", then followed by the generic Top-Level Domain ("gTLD") ".com", which does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity;
- the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name because, among other things, the Complainant has not authorized the Respondent to register a domain name containing the LEATHER Mark and the Respondent has never been commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name; and
- the Disputed Domain Name was registered and is used in bad faith because, among other things, the Respondent used the Disputed Domain Name to impersonate the Complainant or to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the Complainant for the purpose of deceiving unsuspecting customers.

The Complainant seeks the transfer of the Disputed Domain Name in accordance with paragraph 4(i) of the Policy.

## **B. Respondent**

The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions.

## **6. Discussion and Findings**

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant prove the following three elements in order to prevail in this proceeding:

- (i) the Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and
- (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the Disputed Domain Name; and
- (iii) the Disputed Domain Name was registered and is being used in bad faith.

### **A. Identical or Confusingly Similar**

Paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy requires a two-fold inquiry: a threshold investigation into whether a complainant has rights in a trademark, followed by an assessment of whether the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to that trademark. The Panel concludes that in the present case, the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the LEATHER Mark.

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's trademark and the Disputed Domain Name. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (["WIPO Overview 3.1"](#)), section 1.7.

It is uncontroverted that the Complainant has established rights in the LEATHER Mark based on its registered trademarks for the LEATHER Mark in the United States and other jurisdictions worldwide. The registration of a mark satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights for purposes of standing to file a UDRP case. As stated in section 1.2.1 of the [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), "[w]here the complainant holds a nationally or regionally registered trademark or service mark, this prima facie satisfies the threshold requirement of having trademark rights for purposes of standing to file a UDRP case". The Panel finds that the Complainant satisfied the threshold requirement of having trademark rights in the LEATHER Mark.

The Disputed Domain Name consists of the Complainant's LEATHER Mark in its entirety, followed by the terms "desktop" and "app" and then followed the gTLD ".com". The test for confusing similarity involves a side-by-side comparison of the domain name and the textual components of the relevant trademark to assess whether the mark is recognizable within the disputed domain name. The LEATHER Mark is recognizable within the Disputed Domain Name as the LEATHER Mark is used in its entirety and thus, the Panel finds that the additional term does not prevent a finding of the confusing similarity between the LEATHER Mark and the Disputed Domain Name. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 1.8.

Finally, the addition of a gTLD such as ".com" in a domain name is a technical requirement. Thus, it is well established that, as here, such element may typically be disregarded when assessing whether a domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark. See [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 1.11.1. Thus, the Panel finds that the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's LEATHER Mark.

Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the first element of the Policy has been established.

## **B. Rights or Legitimate Interests**

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name. Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving that a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 2.1.

In this case, given the facts as set out above, the Panel finds that the Complainant has made out a prima facie case. The Respondent has not submitted any arguments or evidence to rebut the Complainant's prima facie case. Furthermore, the Complainant has not authorized, licensed, or otherwise permitted the Respondent to use its LEATHER Mark. Nor does the Complainant have any type of business relationship with the Respondent. There is also no evidence that the Respondent is commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name or by any similar name, nor any evidence that the Respondent was using or making demonstrable preparations to use the Disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. See Policy, paragraph 4(c).

The Disputed Domain Name resolves to a website displaying the LEATHER Mark and offering unauthorized LEATHER digital wallet services, in an attempt to pass off as the Complainant. Thus, the Respondent does not have rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. When Internet users arrive at the Respondent's website, they will find a site in which the Respondent attempts to impersonate the Complainant and its official website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant since it uses the Complainant's LEATHER Mark in the Disputed Domain Name, purportedly using the Disputed Domain Name for phishing. The Panel thus determines that the Respondent is not making a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Disputed Domain Name but rather is using the Disputed Domain Name for commercial gain with the intent to mislead the Complainant's customers into believing that they had arrived at a website which is somehow sponsored or endorsed by the Complainant. For example, as described above, the Respondent defrauds users by deceiving them into believing they are setting up a two-factor authentication for their LEATHER-branded digital wallet. The website at the Disputed Domain Name includes a link to set up the two-factor authentication, and the Respondent sends users an email, purportedly from the Complainant. Furthermore, the Respondent is not making a legitimate or fair use of the Disputed Domain Name since it uses some of the Complainant's language verbatim on its website, and copies the image of a smartphone screen used by the Complainant on its official website.

In addition, the Respondent required the Complainant's unsuspecting users to share login credentials to their digital wallets upon arriving at the website and unwittingly provide access and control of their digital assets to the Respondent, allegedly as part of a fraudulent phishing scheme. The use of a phishing scheme does not confer rights or legitimate interests on the Respondent. See *CMA CGM v. Diana Smith*, WIPO Case No. [D2015-1774](#) (finding that the respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, holding that "such phishing scam cannot be considered a bona fide offering of goods or services nor a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the Domain Name").

Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the second element of the Policy has been established.

### **C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith**

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith. The Panel finds that based on the record, the Complainant has demonstrated the existence of the Respondent's bad faith registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name, but other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent's registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 3.2.1.

First, based on the circumstances here, the Panel concludes that the Respondent's registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name had been done for the specific purpose of trading on the name and reputation of the Complainant and its LEATHER Mark. See *Madonna Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and "Madonna.com"*, WIPO Case No. [D2000-0847](#) ("[t]he only plausible explanation for Respondent's actions appears to be an intentional effort to trade upon the fame of Complainant's name and mark for commercial gain").

Second, panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegal activity (such as, as claimed here, passing off and phishing) constitutes bad faith. [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 3.4. Having reviewed the record, the Panel finds that the Respondent's registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name constitutes bad faith under the Policy due to the Respondent's use of an email phishing scheme in which the Respondent sent fraudulent emails to individuals arriving at the website requiring them to set up a two-factor authentication for their LEATHER-branded digital wallet, which would permit the Respondent to have access to those individuals' digital assets. See [WIPO Overview 3.1](#), section 3.1.4 (use of a domain name for per se illegitimate activity such as phishing or impersonation/passing off is considered evidence of bad faith).

The Panel also finds that the Respondent had actual knowledge of the Complainant and its rights in the LEATHER Mark when registering the Disputed Domain Name, emblematic of bad faith registration and use. It strains credulity to believe that the Respondent did not know of the Complainant or its LEATHER Mark when registering the Disputed Domain Name, as evidenced by the inclusion of the LEATHER Mark in the Disputed Domain Name and copying portions of the Complainant's official website without authorization. Thus, the Panel finds that in the present case, the Respondent had the Complainant's LEATHER Mark in mind when registering and using the Disputed Domain Name.

Finally, the Panel concludes that the Respondent's registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name was an attempt to disrupt the Complainant's business for commercial gain. See *Newegg Inc. v. Nicole Alex and Alexander Ethan*, WIPO Case No. [D2019-2740](#) (registration of disputed domain names was likely to have been made in an attempt to receive commercial gain from their exploitation). The Panel additionally finds that the Respondent's use of the Disputed Domain Name is also designed to deceive those arriving at the Respondent's website to think that it was sponsored or was affiliated in some way with the Complainant.

Based on the available record, the Panel finds that the third element of the Policy has been established.

## **7. Decision**

For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Disputed Domain Name <leatherdesktopapp.com> be transferred to the Complainant.

*/Lynda M. Braun/*

**Lynda M. Braun**

Sole Panelist

Date: May 18, 2026