

## **ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION**

Scribd, Inc. v. Wilbert Kevin Piol

Case No. D2025-5344

### **1. The Parties**

The Complainant is Scribd, Inc., United States of America (“United States”), represented by IPLA, United States.

The Respondent is Wilbert Kevin Piol, Philippines.

### **2. The Domain Name and Registrar**

The disputed domain name <dlscrib.app> is registered with NameCheap, Inc. (the “Registrar”).

### **3. Procedural History**

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on December 19, 2025. On December 22, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On December 23, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (NameCheap, Inc. (Registrar)) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on December 23, 2025, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on December 29, 2025.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on December 30, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was January 19, 2026. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent’s default on January 20, 2026.

The Center appointed Richard C.K. van Oerle as the sole panelist in this matter on January 23, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

#### **4. Factual Background**

The Complainant has been operating since 2007. It offers online software and retail platforms for computer, electronic, and software-related goods, including subscriptions to digital content such as e-books, audiobooks, magazines, podcasts, and documents, through its official website at “www.scribd.com” (registered on September 24, 2006). The Complainant asserts that it has served over 1,950,000 paying subscribers and currently receives more than 200,000,000 unique monthly visitors to its official website.

The Complainant holds numerous trademarks registrations for SCRIBD on a worldwide basis, among others:

- United States Trademark Registration No. 3777227 for SCRIBD, registered on April 20, 2010;
- United States Trademark Registration No. 5898302 for SCRIBD, registered on October 29, 2019; and
- Philippines Trademark Registration, registration No 1491187, registered August 6, 2019, where the Respondent is apparently located; hereinafter collectively referred to as the Trademark.

According to the information provided by the Registrar, the disputed domain name was registered on April 30, 2024. It resolves to a website that provides users the ability to download content from the Complainant's platform without subscribing.

#### **5. Parties' Contentions**

##### **A. Complainant**

The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant's Trademark. It combines the element “dl,” a commonly used abbreviation for “download” or “downloader,” with an almost complete reproduction of the Trademark, differing only by the omission of the final letter “d.” This minor alteration constitutes classic typosquatting, as it can easily result from a simple typing error on a standard QWERTY keyboard. The addition of the descriptive term “dl” does not distinguish the disputed domain name from the Trademark; rather, it increases the risk of confusion, as it is likely to be understood as a reference to “download” or “downloader,” closely associated with the Complainant's services.

The disputed domain was registered after the first use dates and/or trademark registration dates of the Trademark and after the Complainant's website was registered and operational. The Complainant notes that the disputed domain name provides users the ability to download content from the Complainant's platform without subscribing by acting as a proxy and manipulating the URL link. It advertises “Download Any Scribd Documents Online for Free” and directly states “Dscribd.app Scribd downloader is a helpful tool that can be used by everyone who wants to download documents from Scribd for free,” meaning that the disputed domain name offers a tool to download the Complainant's content without proper compensation. Thus, the disputed domain name is not being utilized in connection with a bona fide offering of goods/services as it currently does not offer any services or goods of its own but creates free access to copyrighted works that would only be accessible in full by paying for the Complainant's services. This is concrete evidence that the Respondent is intentionally using the Complainant's Trademark to redirect potential customers away from the Complainant's services.

Further, the Complainant is not aware of any trademark rights, domain name rights, or other rights that the Respondent has relating to the Trademark, nor has the Complainant ever authorized the Respondent to use its Trademark in connection with any goods or services. Additionally, nothing in the Respondent's Whois information or any other publicly available source suggests the Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name. Therefore, the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name.

The Complainant has been substantially, exclusively, and continuously using its Trademark since at least as early as 2006, when it first acquired the domain name <scribd.com>, well before the Respondent registered the disputed domain name. It is therefore "inconceivable" that the Respondent did not know of the Complainant's prior rights. Upon registering the confusingly similar domain name, the Respondent began offering its users the ability to avoid signing up for the Complainant's services by acting as a proxy and manipulating the target URL to allow for the free download of copyrighted documents.

Moreover, the Complainant contends that the Respondent's act of typosquatting is evidence of bad faith per se. As of December 18, 2025, the disputed domain name continues to allow users to avoid signing up for the Complainant's services and therefore the disputed domain name is not being utilized in connection with a bona fide offering of goods/services. The disputed domain name reproduces the Trademark causing Internet users to err as to the source of the website to which the disputed domain name has resolved and the works made available therein. Such use does not represent a legitimate or bona fide offering of goods and services.

Thus, the Respondent is using the Trademark and the offending domain to redirect traffic away from the Complainant and the services it offers. The Complainant contends that the Respondent registered and/or acquired the disputed domain name and used the domain name in bad faith to intentionally attempt to extort money or attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's Trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the website. Accordingly, unless the disputed domain name is transferred to the Complainant, the Respondent will continue to use the disputed domain name in bad faith.

## **B. Respondent**

The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions.

## **6. Discussion and Findings**

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy provides that a complainant must prove each of the following three elements in order to succeed in its Complaint:

- (i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights; and
- (ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and
- (iii) the disputed domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

The burden of proof of each element is borne by the Complainant. The Respondent's default does not by itself mean that the Complainant is deemed to have prevailed. See WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition, ("[WIPO Overview 3.0](#)"), section 4.3.

## **A. Identical or Confusingly Similar**

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's Trademark and the disputed domain name. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.7.

The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.2.1.

The Panel finds the Trademark is recognizable within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is confusingly similar to the Trademark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.7.

Although the addition of other terms, here "dl", an abbreviation for "download" or "downloader", may bear on assessment of the second and third elements, the Panel finds the addition of such term does not prevent a finding of confusing similarity between the disputed domain name and the mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.8.

Moreover, while the content of the website is typically disregarded under the first element analysis, the Panel here notes that on the website at the disputed domain name the Trademark is used frequently and that this website offers the option of downloading documents from the Complainant's website for free, which confirms the confusing similarity. See WIPO Overview, section 1.15.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

## **B. Rights or Legitimate Interests**

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.

Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a *prima facie* case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.1.

There is no evidence of any trademark rights, domain name rights, or other rights or legitimate interest that the Respondent has relating to the Trademark, nor has the Complainant ever authorized the Respondent to use its Trademark in connection with any goods or services. Additionally, nothing in the Respondent's Whois information suggests the Respondent is commonly known by the disputed domain name.

Having reviewed the available record, the Panel finds the Complainant has established a *prima facie* case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Respondent has not rebutted the Complainant's *prima facie* showing and has not come forward with any relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name such as those enumerated in the Policy or otherwise.

The composition of the disputed domain name carries a risk of implied affiliation with the Complainant ([WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.5.1). Such inference appears to be the intent of the Respondent given the use of the disputed domain name to host a webstore allegedly offering the Complainant's services for free, which ultimately does not represent a *bona fide* offering of goods or services ([WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.8).

Panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegitimate activity, here, claimed passing off, or other types of fraud, can never confer rights or legitimate interests on a respondent. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.13.1.

The Panel finds the second element of the Policy has been established.

### **C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith**

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy sets out a list of non-exhaustive circumstances that may indicate that a domain name was registered and used in bad faith, but other circumstances may be relevant in assessing whether a respondent's registration and use of a domain name is in bad faith. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 3.2.1.

The registration and use of the Trademark predates the disputed domain name registration by many years. Also considering the composition of the disputed domain name, it is likely that the Respondent did know of the Complainant's prior rights when registering the disputed domain name. The registration of the disputed domain name was therefore in bad faith.

The disputed domain name resolves to a website that provides users the ability to download content from the Complainant's platform without subscribing by acting as a proxy and manipulating the URL link. It advertises "Download Any Scribd Documents Online for Free" and directly states "Dlscribd.app Scribd downloader is a helpful tool that can be used by everyone who wants to download documents from Scribd for free", meaning that the disputed domain name offers a tool to download the Complainant's content without proper compensation. The Respondent's use of the disputed domain name can therefore not be considered to be in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services and is in bad faith.

Panels have held that the use of a domain name for illegitimate activity, here, claimed passing off, or other types of fraud) constitutes bad faith. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 3.4. Having reviewed the record, and referring to what was considered above under B, the Panel finds the Respondent's registration and use of the disputed domain name constitutes bad faith under the Policy.

The Panel finds that the Complainant has established the third element of the Policy.

## **7. Decision**

For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the disputed domain name <dlscrib.app> be transferred to the Complainant.

*/Richard C.K. van Oerle/  
Richard C.K. van Oerle  
Sole Panelist  
Date: January 30, 2026*