

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

AAMP of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Stinger v. Tom de Wilde, Stinger Electronics B.V.
Case No. D2025-5185

1. The Parties

The Complainant is AAMP of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Stinger, United States of America (“United States”), represented by Fredrikson & Byron, PA, United States.

The Respondent is Tom de Wilde, Stinger Electronics B.V., Netherlands (Kingdom of the) (“Netherlands”), represented by LegalMatters.com B.V., Netherlands.

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name <stinger.com> is registered with Hosting Concepts B.V. d/b/a Registrar.eu. (the “Registrar”).

3. Procedural History

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on December 11, 2025. On December 12, 2025, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On December 14, 2025, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent (Carcomputer B.V.) and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on December 17, 2025, providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amendment to the Complaint on the same day.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amendment to the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy” or “UDRP”), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on December 19, 2025. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was January 12, 2026. The Response was filed with the Center on January 12, 2026.

The Center appointed Andrew D. S. Lothian as the sole panelist in this matter on February 2, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

4. Factual Background

According to the Complaint, the Complainant is a Florida, United States, corporation that was founded in 1987. The Complainant claims to have launched its “Stinger” brand of audio sound systems, lighting, safety cameras, and other equipment in 1990, noting that it sells this brand via its website at “www.stingerdrive.com” and via specialty stores and third party websites. The Complainant claims to have sold USD 26 million of this brand of products in 2022 and to have spent USD 1.4 million to advertise said brand.

The Complainant owns a variety of United States registered trademarks for the STINGER mark, the earliest of which appears to be United States Registered Trademark Number 1673306 for the stylized word mark STINGER, registered on January 28, 1992, in Class 9.

The disputed domain name was registered on May 27, 1998. The Respondent appears to be a Netherlands company (besloten vennootschap) named Carcomputer B.V. (“second Respondent”) and one of its board members, Tom de Wilde (“first Respondent”), together described as “Respondent” unless the context otherwise indicates. According to a Business Register extract from the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce produced by the Respondent, the second Respondent also uses the trade names “Stinger” and “Stinger Electronics”, whereby it may also be described as “Stinger Electronics B.V.”, as shown in the instance of this Decision. The second Respondent was incorporated on March 14, 2002. A screenshot of the website associated with the disputed domain name, dated December 10, 2025, produced by the Complainant is entitled “Stinger – speedtrap protection for high-performance cars”, noting that the second Respondent provides laser-only, radar-only or laser and radar speedtrap protection devices which are branded “Stinger”. The said screenshot appears to relate to an online store targeted to the United States, in that the URL is “us.stinger.com/store/”. The postal address on this page of the website lists an address in Lakewood Ranch, Florida, United States and an email address “[...]@carcomputerusa.com”.

On March 23, 2005, the second Respondent entered into an agreement with an entity named Stichting Noble House whereby the rights to certain STINGER trademarks and names were transferred to the second Respondent. This included European Union Registered Trademark Number 831263 for the word mark STINGER, registered on August 7, 2003, in Class 9. The Panel notes in passing that said trademark had been the subject of an unsuccessful opposition by the Complainant (Decision Number 233/2003 of January 31, 2003, Ruling on Opposition Number B 227 779). The said agreement also included Benelux Registered Trademark Number 619404 for the word mark STINGER, filed on November 28, 1997, and registered on June 1, 1998 (i.e., five days after the registration date of the disputed domain name) in Class 9.

On December 1, 2016, Stichting Noble House and Carcomputer B.V. assigned to Jim Sven Anthony de Wilde and Tom Marnix Alexander de Wilde (confirmed in the Response to be the first Respondent) all rights, including the registered trademark rights in respect of the STINGER mark. These individuals are board members of the second Respondent. Said assignment included the rights to European Union Registered Trademark Number 831263 and Benelux Registered Trademark Number 619404 noted above.

5. Parties' Contentions

A. Complainant

The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

Notably, the Complainant contends that the disputed domain name was registered by the Respondent or its predecessor on or about May 27, 1998, which is after the Complainant's first use of its STINGER trademark in 1990 and after it received multiple federal registrations in the United States for its STINGER marks. The Complainant notes that the disputed domain name includes the entirety of the Complainant's trademark, adding that this is sufficient to establish that it is identical or confusingly similar to the Complainant's registered trademark for the purposes of the Policy.

The Complainant asserts that the disputed domain name promotes or suggests a connection or relationship between the Respondent and the Complainant where none exists, that the Complainant has never authorized the Respondent to register or use the disputed domain name or to provide any goods or services for the Complainant, that there is no connection or relationship or any kind or nature between the Complainant and the Respondent, that the unauthorized registration of the Complainant's trademark in the disputed domain name undermines a claim of bona fide use under the Policy, and that the Complainant believes that the Respondent chose the disputed domain name because of the reputation of the Complainant. The Complainant adds that this is especially true given that the Complainant's trademark consists of a unique non-descriptive word which the Respondent has no legitimate noncommercial or fair use reason to use in the disputed domain name.

The Complainant submits that the Respondent is using the Complainant's mark in the disputed domain name as a principal identifier of its website and goods, adding that by using the disputed domain name, and creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant's mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's goods, the Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract visitors to its website or location for commercial gain. The Complainant also alleges that, due to its use of the STINGER mark since as early as 1990 and its ownership of registered trademarks for the STINGER mark going back to as early as 1992, the Respondent was aware that the Complainant had rights in the STINGER mark when it registered or took possession of the disputed domain name, which is emblematic of bad faith registration and use.

B. Respondent

The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

The Respondent first notes that it does not deny that the disputed domain name is identical to the Complainant's trademark. The Respondent asserts however that it and its subsidiaries have rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name. The Respondent points out that Stinger Electronics is one of the tradenames of Carcomputer B.V., the second Respondent, and adds that Tom de Wilde, the first Respondent, is one of the board members of said company (evidence provided).

The Respondent asserts that by virtue of the assignment of the STINGER marks, described in the factual background section above, the Respondent has rights and legitimate interests therein through its board members.

The Respondent contends that it has registered and is using the disputed domain name to conduct its own business under its tradenames "Stinger" and "Stinger Electronics" and is selling its own products under the trademark STINGER. The Respondent concludes that the disputed domain name was not registered and is not being used in bad faith by the Respondent.

6. Discussion and Findings

A. Identical or Confusingly Similar

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's trademark and the disputed domain name. WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition ("[WIPO Overview 3.0](#)"), section 1.7.

The Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.2.1.

The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 1.7.

The Panel notes in particular that the Respondent effectively indicates that it does not contest this element of the Policy.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

B. Rights or Legitimate Interests

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.

Although the overall burden of proof in UDRP proceedings is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.1.

Having reviewed the available record, the Panel finds the Complainant has established a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name based on its submissions that it promotes or suggests a relationship between the Parties where none exists, that the Complainant has never authorized the Respondent to register or use the disputed domain name or to provide any goods or services thereunder, that the unauthorized registration of the Complainant's trademark in the disputed domain name undermines a claim of bona fide use under the Policy, and that the disputed domain name was selected because of the reputation of the Complainant.

The Panel therefore turns to the Respondent's case in rebuttal. This is brief in extent and focuses on the fact that the second Respondent itself has registered trademarks (or at least, the Panel assumes, has a license of such mark via its directors, one of whom is the first Respondent) in the mark STINGER.

Panels have recognized that a respondent's prior registration of a trademark which corresponds to a domain name will ordinarily support a finding of rights or legitimate interests in that domain name for purposes of the second element. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.12.1. The existence of a respondent trademark does not however automatically confer rights or legitimate interests on the respondent. For example, panels have generally declined to find respondent rights or legitimate interests in a domain name on the basis of a corresponding trademark registration where the overall circumstances demonstrate that such trademark was obtained primarily to circumvent the application of the UDRP or otherwise prevent the complainant's exercise of its rights (even if only in a particular jurisdiction). Absent evidence of such circumstances indicating

pretext however, panels have been reluctant to reject a respondent trademark registration out of hand. [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 2.12.2.

Here, there is no evidence that the Respondent's marks were obtained to circumvent the application of the UDRP or to prevent the Complainant's exercise of its rights. Indeed, the Respondent's European Union trademark appears to have been unsuccessfully opposed by the Complainant as long ago as 2003, and the Panel assumes that the Respondent has traded continuously thereafter using the said mark, albeit the mark has been held under slightly different ownership and/or licensing arrangements over the years. The disputed domain name was registered some five days before the Respondent's Benelux trademark STINGER proceeded to grant, and well after the corresponding trademark application had been filed. The Panel sees no reason why such mark would not support a finding of rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name for purposes of the second element.

The Panel notes that the Complainant's screenshots of the website associated with the disputed domain name suggest that the Respondent appears to be doing business in the United States and is selling its in-car detectors under the STINGER mark there, providing an address on said website which is situated in the state where the Complainant is based. The Complainant did not expressly assert that this infringes its United States trademark(s). Whether this would or would not amount to such infringement under the relevant national law is not for the Panel to say. In any event, given the Panel's finding on the third element of the Policy below, it is not necessary for the Panel to reach a concluded position regarding the second element assessment under the Policy.

C. Registered and Used in Bad Faith

The Panel notes that, for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy, paragraph 4(b) of the Policy establishes circumstances, in particular, but without limitation, that, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith.

In the present case, the Panel has some concerns regarding the present use of the disputed domain name at least insofar as consumers in the United States are concerned. As noted above, whether this does or does not infringe the Complainant's United States trademark(s) which appear to be registered in respect of similar but not identical goods is not the subject of any submission from the Parties. Utilizing its power to undertake limited factual research as outlined in [WIPO Overview 3.0](#), section 4.8, the Panel also notes that, when visiting the website at the disputed domain name, the first webpage instructs visitors to "Choose Your Site" and provides a list of options including the "World", as well as a variety of countries to choose from across Asia, Europe, and North America (the North America link leads to the United States website presented as evidence in the Complaint). This could indicate that the Respondent's business in the United States resulted as a natural business expansion rather than specific targeting of the Complainant in its jurisdiction. In any event, and despite these concerns relating to the current use of the disputed domain name, the issue is moot due to the conjunctive requirement in paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy in terms of which the Complainant must prove not only use in bad faith but also registration in bad faith.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary from the Complainant, the Panel proceeds on the basis that the Respondent, and/or its predecessor(s) in interest, is or are the original registrants of the disputed domain name. No evidence has been placed before the Panel here indicating that when the Respondent or its predecessors selected the disputed domain name in May 1998 they did so with intent to target the Complainant and its trademark. Crucially, there is no evidence as to the extent or reach of the Complainant's mark at the material date and nothing on the basis of which the Panel could reasonably infer that the Complainant's mark would likely have come to the Respondent or its predecessors' notice, far less that they intended to target it unfairly. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Respondent and/or its predecessors appear to have registered the disputed domain name both coincidentally and independently of the Complainant's rights, and in connection with their own in-car device business for which they subsequently registered and have used corresponding trademarks, the application for one of which was unsuccessfully opposed by the Complainant many years ago.

In these circumstances, the Panel does not find that disputed domain name was registered in bad faith, and consequently the Complaint fails.

7. Decision

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

/Andrew D. S. Lothian/

Andrew D. S. Lothian

Sole Panelist

Date: February 12, 2026