

## **ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION**

Legally Co. LLC v. Stefan van Elsas, LegalVision B.V.  
Case No. DIO2026-0004

### **1. The Parties**

The Complainant is Legally Co. LLC, United States of America, represented by Luke Brean, United States of America (“United States” or “U.S.”).

The Respondent is Stefan van Elsas, LegalVision B.V., Netherlands (Kingdom of the), represented by Motsnyi IP Group, Serbia.

### **2. The Domain Name and Registrar**

The disputed domain name <legally.io> is registered with GoDaddy.com, LLC (the “Registrar”).

### **3. Procedural History**

The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the “Center”) on January 30, 2026. On February 2, 2026, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the disputed domain name. On February 2, 2026, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response disclosing registrant and contact information for the disputed domain name which differed from the named Respondent and contact information in the Complaint. The Center sent an email communication to the Complainant on February 6, 2026 providing the registrant and contact information disclosed by the Registrar, and inviting the Complainant to submit an amendment to the Complaint. The Complainant filed an amended Complaint on February 10, 2026.

The Center verified that the Complaint together with the amended Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the .IO Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”), the Rules for .IO Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for .IO Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Supplemental Rules”).

In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs 2 and 4, the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on February 10, 2026. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph 5, the due date for Response was March 6, 2026. The Response was filed with the Center on March 6, 2026.

The Complainant filed a Supplemental Submission on March 7, 2026. The Respondent filed an objection to the Complainant's Supplemental Submission on March 10, 2026.

The Center appointed John Swinson, Tony Willoughby, and Sally M. Abel as the panelists in this matter on April 16, 2026. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.

#### 4. Factual Background

The Complainant is a corporation from Delaware, United States. The Complainant commenced business operations in November 2015.

The Complainant provides its services online at a website located at <legally.co>.

According to the Complainant, the Complainant initially provided online legal information and legal document preparation. In 2024, the Complainant migrated its platform to a service that provides a free United States trademark cease-and-desist letter template and uses this service to generate leads for a separate paid attorney review service.

The Complainant owns registered trademarks for LEGALLY in the United States and Canada, and for LEGALLY as part of a device mark in the United Kingdom and Europe, namely:

- United States Registration No. 4893377 for LEGALLY that was filed on February 27, 2014 and registered on January 26, 2016;
- Canadian Registration No. TMA948913 that was registered on September 12, 2016;
- United Kingdom ("UK") Registration No. UK00003467610 (figurative mark) that was filed on February 17, 2020 and registered on August 9, 2020;
- European Union ("EU") Registration No. 018616512 (figurative mark) that was registered on April 16, 2023.

The Complainant was unsuccessful in a prior dispute under the Policy, *Legally Co v. Domain Administrator, NameFind LLC*, WIPO Case No. [D2018-1958](#) concerning the domain name <legally.com> (discussed below).

The disputed domain name was first registered on November 8, 2014.

The Respondent is a business based in the Netherlands. The Respondent purchased the disputed domain name on December 13, 2023, for USD 7,500.

The Respondent launched its online service in 2024. The Respondent's service assists in drafting legal documents. According to the FAQ section on the Respondent's website at the disputed domain name:

"Legally.io is a leading platform for creating and managing legal documents online with ease and confidence. With access to over 300+ customizable, legally compliant templates, our platform simplifies legal needs across various regions and jurisdictions. Legally.io also streamlines the entire process—allowing you to **search, create, sign, and send documents** in just a few clicks. Whether you're preparing contracts, agreements, or other legal forms, Legally.io ensures a seamless, professional experience every step of the way."

On December 15, 2025, the Complainant sent a cease and desist letter to the Respondent notifying them of the Complainant's trademark rights, and asserting infringement of its United States, European, Canadian and United Kingdom trademarks. Correspondence was exchanged between the parties for about four weeks, but no resolution was reached.

## **5. Parties' Contentions**

### **A. Complainant**

The Complainant contends that it has satisfied each of the elements required under the Policy for a transfer of the disputed domain name.

In summary, the Complainant makes the following submissions.

The Complainant has continuously used the LEGALLY trademark in commerce since at least November 10, 2015. Its services include providing online legal information and legal document preparation, targeting global users including those located in the United States, Canada, European Union, and United Kingdom.

The Complainant has established trademark rights in the mark LEGALLY through multiple valid and subsisting international registrations and extensive common law use.

The Respondent's website targets global users, prices its services in US dollars and offers document templates specific to local laws in the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom, emphasizing its multijurisdictional nature (and overlapping with three of the four jurisdictions in which the Complainant has registered trademarks).

The Respondent has no authorization, license, or permission from the Complainant to use the LEGALLY mark. There is no evidence that the Respondent has been commonly known by the name "Legally" or the disputed domain name.

The Respondent's use does not constitute a bona fide offering of goods or services under paragraph 4(c)(i) of the Policy. The Respondent's website, launched around January 24, 2024 (well after the Complainant's 2015 use and global trademark registrations) offers identical or highly similar commercial services, including over 300 legal templates, guided customization for local compliance (targeting U.S., EU, UK users), and e signing. This imitates the Complainant's legal document generation service at <legally.co> without disclaimers, creating a likelihood of confusion as to affiliation or endorsement for commercial gain.

Even if LEGALLY were argued to be descriptive, the Complainant's incontestable United States registration (No. 4,893,377) confirms its distinctiveness and secondary meaning through substantial goodwill and revenue (several million dollars since 2015), precluding generic defenses.

A routine trademark search by the Respondent at registration would have revealed the Complainant's filing, suggesting possible awareness, but panels often infer registration bad faith from subsequent abusive conduct.

If the Respondent acquired the disputed domain name in 2024, such acquisition would post-date the Complainant's well-established trademark rights (e.g., U.S. registration in 2016, incontestable status, and continuous use since 2015 generating millions in revenue), as well as its global goodwill. At that time, the Respondent knew or should have known of the Complainant's rights (evidenced by the identical mark, overlapping services, and trademark registrations in every single market the Respondent has launched in) yet proceeded to register/acquire it for exploitative purposes, satisfying bad faith registration under .IO Policy 4(b) (e.g., 4(b)(iv) for intentional confusion and commercial gain).

The disputed domain name is unequivocally being used in bad faith. Launched around January 24, 2024, the Respondent's website exploits the LEGALLY mark by offering identical legal document preparation services. This creates a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation, intentionally attracting users for commercial gain under .IO Policy 4(b)(iv).

Further evidencing bad faith, the Respondent gained actual knowledge of the Complainant's rights via the December 15, 2025, cease-and-desist letter, yet continued infringing use.

## **B. Respondent**

The Respondent contends that the Complainant has not satisfied the second and third elements under the Policy.

In summary, the Respondent makes the following submissions.

The Respondent acquired the disputed domain name to develop a bona fide business, being an online platform that allows creation of legal documents. The disputed domain name was chosen for its dictionary value as a descriptive term that has a clear reference to the business – creation of legal documents and providing alternative legal solutions. The price paid for the disputed domain name by the Respondent reflects its value as an attractive dictionary word.

The Respondent did not target the Complainant or any other business with intent to take unfair commercial advantage as the Respondent was not aware of the Complainant on the date of his registration of the disputed domain name. The Respondent only became aware of the Complainant after he received a cease and desist letter for the Complainant.

The Respondent did not target any existing business, including the Complainant, when the Respondent chose the disputed domain name. The disputed domain name was not associated with any business known to the Respondent on the date of its acquisition. The Respondent chose the disputed domain name for its value as a memorable dictionary word related to the Respondent's planned business of providing alternative legal solutions. The use of the disputed domain name is bona fide because it is genuine (non-pretextual) and the Respondent did not target the Complainant.

The Complainant itself admits that the disputed domain name is used for real business with "Trustpilot" reviews and provides screenshots of the current version of the Respondent's website and "Trustpilot" reviews.

Contrary to the Complainant's claim of "imitation", the Respondent never imitated the Complainant or the Complainant's website. Both websites are very different, both in terms of graphics and text and in terms of layout and in terms of services offered via both websites.

The Complainant is not entirely honest when it describes its services in the Complaint as "preparation of legal documents". The Complainant's services are the following: creating cease and desist letters to stop infringement of United States trademarks. Such services are limited to only cease and desist letters (rather than general legal and business documents) and only to United States trademarks. The Complainant's services can only be used by owners of United States trademark registrations. Therefore, while both Parties offer some drafting services in a broad sense, their services do not overlap.

The Respondent is not engaged in any illegal activity, is not engaged in passing off or fraud and its website is not "copycat" of the Complainant's website. The Respondent does not make any claims that his website is somehow connected to the Complainant. The Respondent does not create any association with the Complainant or its business. The Respondent was simply not aware of the Complainant's existence when the Respondent registered the disputed domain name and started developing its website.

The .IO Policy and relevant case law is based on the UDRP and has a rather narrow scope. It should apply to cybersquatters, not owners of legitimate businesses and holders of legitimate interests. This dispute can best be characterized as a dispute between two holders of competing legitimate interests. Both Parties have rights and legitimate interests in respect of the term “legally” and both Parties use it for their own businesses.

The Complainant failed to provide any evidence of reputation of its trademark. There is no evidence of targeting.

## 6. Discussion and Findings

To succeed, the Complainant must demonstrate that all of the elements enumerated in paragraph 4(a) of the Policy have been satisfied, namely:

(i) the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(ii) the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the disputed domain name; and

(iii) the disputed domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith.

The *onus* of proving these elements is on the Complainant.

An asserting party needs to establish that it is more likely than not that the claimed fact is true. An asserting party cannot meet its burden by simply making conclusory statements unsupported by evidence. To allow a party to merely make factual claims without any supporting evidence would essentially eviscerate the requirements of the Policy as both complainants and respondents could simply claim anything without any proof. For this reason, UDRP panels have generally dismissed factual allegations that are not supported by any bona fide documentary or other credible evidence. *Snowflake, Inc. v. Ezra Silverman*, WIPO Case No. [DIO2020-0007](#); *Captain Fin Co. LLC v. Private Registration, NameBrightPrivacy.com / Adam Grunweg*, WIPO Case No. [D2021-3279](#).

Moreover, in writing the Decision, the Panel must have regard to paragraph 15(e) of the Rules and in particular the following sentence namely:

“If after considering the submissions the Panel finds that the complaint was brought in bad faith, for example in an attempt at Reverse Domain Name Hijacking or was brought primarily to harass the domain-name holder, the Panel shall declare in its Decision that the complaint was brought in bad faith and constitutes an abuse of the administrative proceeding.”

Reverse Domain Name Hijacking is defined in paragraph 1 of the Rules as “using the Policy in bad faith to attempt to deprive a registered domain-name holder of a domain name”.

## Supplemental Submission

The Complainant filed a Supplemental Submission. The Respondent filed an objection to the Complainant’s Supplemental Submission.

Paragraphs 10 and 12 of the Rules grant the Panel sole discretion to determine the admissibility of unsolicited supplemental filings. While paragraph 10(d) states that: “The Panel shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence”, paragraph 12 provides that: “In addition to the complaint and the response, the Panel may request, in its sole discretion, further statements or documents from either of the Parties”. As a general matter, unsolicited supplemental filings are generally discouraged, unless specifically requested by the panel.

The Complainant has not shown reasons that convince the Panel that a supplemental submission is warranted or that there are exceptional circumstances in this case. The submissions and the additional evidence provided, if relevant, should have been provided in the Complaint.

However, the Panel has decided to consider the Supplemental Submission and the Respondent's objection because the Supplemental Submission provides further detail that clarifies the overly broad statements in the Complaint regarding the Complainant's service, including how the Complainant's service was narrowed in 2024 to focus on United States trademark cease and desist letters, which confirms statements relied upon by the Respondent.

#### **A. Identical or Confusingly Similar**

It is well accepted that the first element functions primarily as a standing requirement. The standing (or threshold) test for confusing similarity involves a reasoned but relatively straightforward comparison between the Complainant's trademark and the disputed domain name.

Based on the available record, the Panel finds the Complainant has shown rights in respect of a trademark or service mark for the purposes of the Policy.

The entirety of the mark is reproduced within the disputed domain name. Accordingly, the disputed domain name is identical to the mark for the purposes of the Policy.

The Respondent does not contest the first element of the Policy.

The Panel finds the first element of the Policy has been established.

#### **B. Rights or Legitimate Interests**

Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides a list of circumstances in which the Respondent may demonstrate rights or legitimate interests in a disputed domain name.

Although the overall burden of proof in proceedings under the Policy is on the complainant, panels have recognized that proving a respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in a domain name may result in the difficult task of "proving a negative", requiring information that is often primarily within the knowledge or control of the respondent. As such, where a complainant makes out a prima facie case that the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests, the burden of production on this element shifts to the respondent to come forward with relevant evidence demonstrating rights or legitimate interests in the domain name (although the burden of proof always remains on the complainant). If the respondent fails to come forward with such relevant evidence, the complainant is deemed to have satisfied the second element.

There is no dispute between the Parties that the Respondent is operating an online business.

The Complainant asserts that the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name is not a bona fide offering of goods and services because the Respondent's website was launched after the Complainant's trademarks were registered and the Respondent's website offers identical or highly similar commercial services to the Complainant's online services prior to 2024. As discussed below in respect of the third element, the Panel does not consider that the Respondent's use of the disputed domain name is not a bona fide offering of goods and services.

The Respondent's use of a dictionary term for a service that is related to the dictionary meaning of that term is, in the present case, not evidence of a lack of bona fides by the Respondent. *Orange Brand Services Limited v. Registration Private, Domains by Proxy, LLC / Park Ave, miniOrange Incorporated*, WIPO Case No. [D2019-1170](#).

There is no evidence that the Respondent's website is a sham website.

In short, paragraph 4(c)(i) applies in the present case, that is, the Respondent has demonstrated that before any notice to the Respondent of the dispute, the Respondent has shown use of, or demonstrable preparations to use, the disputed domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services. Thus the Respondent has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Panel that it has a right or legitimate interest in respect of the disputed domain name.

The Panel finds the second element of the Policy has not been established.

### **C. Registered or Used in Bad Faith**

Paragraph 4(a)(iii) of the Policy provides that the Complainant must establish that the Respondent registered or used the disputed domain name in bad faith. Unlike the UDRP, under the Policy (being the .IO Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy), it is sufficient for the complainant to prove that either registration or use of the domain name is in bad faith, whereas the UDRP requires the complainant to prove both.

Generally speaking, a finding that a domain name has been registered or is being used in bad faith requires an inference to be drawn that the respondent in question has registered or is using the disputed domain name to take advantage of its significance as a trademark owned by (usually) the complainant.

The Respondent asserts that it was unaware of the Complainant or the Complainant's LEGALLY mark when it purchased the disputed domain name in 2023 or launched its online service in 2024. The Respondent asserts that it first became aware of the Complainant upon receipt of a cease and desist letter from the Complainant in December 2025.

The Panel finds it believable that the Respondent did not purchase or use the disputed domain name because of or knowing of the Complainant or the Complainant's mark. The Complainant did not provide convincing evidence that the Complainant or its United States trademark cease and desist letter service would likely have been known to the Respondent who is located in the Netherlands. There was no evidence provided of the Complainant's reputation, sales, advertising or marketing in Europe in 2024 or 2025, or that the Complainant's trademark cease and desist letter service is well-known.

The Respondent asserts that it selected and purchased the disputed domain name because of its dictionary meaning related to the services provided by the Respondent. Moreover, the Respondent's services are different to the Complainant's services. The Complainant's services are limited to generation of a cease and desist letter in respect of a United States trademark. The Respondent's services are to generate and manage contracts and other legal documents, based on over 300 templates (for example, a loan agreement, a shareholders agreement, a will, a power of attorney).

The Respondent's evidence shows that it has used and is using the disputed domain name for a legal document generation and management platform, with numerous existing clients using the platform. The Respondent's use of the platform appears to be for a genuine, active business, and is not merely a pretext. See, for example, *Donald Miller Words, LLC v. Shaunna Menard*, WIPO Case No. [DIO2025-0035](#).

There is no evidence before the Panel that the Respondent registered or is using the dispute domain name to target the Complainant or to take advantage of the Complainant's trademark or reputation.

In short, this is not a clear case of cybersquatting by the Respondent. There may be a genuine commercial dispute between the Parties, but the Policy is not designed to resolve disputes other than in the narrow bounds of the Policy. The Policy is also not appropriate to decide complex questions of evidence, such as whether the Respondent's website is targeted at users in the United States.

The Panel's finding on the issue of bad faith does not mean that Complainant lacks valid trademark rights or that Complainant's trademark is so commonplace as to be unenforceable as a matter of trademark law. The

Panel's findings are for purposes of this Policy proceeding, and do not prevent the Complainant from bringing court proceedings against the Respondent if the Complainant can establish such a case.

When a dispute involves intentional trademark infringement, panels have been able to dispose of a case under the Policy or UDRP but in cases of potential trademark infringement which raise complex evidentiary and substantive issues beyond clear cybersquatting, such matters are generally considered to be more appropriately resolved in judicial proceedings rather than under the Policy. *Data Parrot Holdings, LLC v. Christopher Hamoen*, WIPO Case No. [DAI2024-0072](#).

The Panel finds the third element of the Policy has not been established.

#### **D. Reverse Domain Name Hijacking (“RDNH”)**

The WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Select UDRP Questions (“[WIPO Overview 3.1](#)”) sets out, as its title indicates, issues commonly faced by panels deciding UDRP cases and how they have dealt with them. The Policy was based on the UDRP, and its wording is in many respects identical to that of the UDRP. The WIPO Overview is therefore a useful resource when considering issues arising in a case under the Policy, a fact appreciated by the Complainant who cited it 14 times in the Complaint.

Paragraph 15(e) of the Rules is identical to paragraph 15(e) of the UDRP Rules and the definition of RDNH in the Policy is identical to that in the UDRP.

Section 4.16 of [WIPO Overview 3.1](#) deals with the circumstances under which panels will issue a finding of RDNH. The first point to note is that it is not necessary for a respondent to seek an RDNH finding or prove the presence of conduct constituting RDNH. The Respondent has not sought such a finding in this case. The second point to note is that mere lack of success of a complaint is not of itself sufficient for a finding of RDNH.

Reasons articulated by panels for finding RDNH include: (i) facts which demonstrate that the complainant knew it could not succeed as to any of the required three elements – such as the complainant's lack of relevant trademark rights, clear knowledge of respondent rights or legitimate interests, or clear knowledge of a lack of respondent bad faith (see generally section 3.8) such as registration of the disputed domain name well before the complainant acquired trademark rights, (ii) facts which demonstrate that the complainant clearly ought to have known it could not succeed under any fair interpretation of facts reasonably available prior to the filing of the complaint, including relevant facts on the website at the disputed domain name or readily available public sources such as the WhoIs [RDAP] database, (iii) unreasonably ignoring established Policy precedent notably as captured in this WIPO Overview – except in limited circumstances which prima facie justify advancing an alternative legal argument, (iv) the provision of false evidence, or otherwise attempting to mislead the panel, (v) the provision of intentionally incomplete material evidence – often clarified by the respondent, (vi) the complainant's failure to disclose that a case is a UDRP refiling, (vii) filing the complaint after an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the disputed domain name from the respondent without a plausible legal basis, (viii) basing a complaint on only the barest of allegations without any supporting evidence.

Given the undertakings in paragraphs 3(b)(xiii) and (xiv) of the Rules, some panels have held that a represented complainant should be held to a higher standard.

In this case the Complaint has failed primarily because it failed to include anything beyond bare assertion to establish that its reputation and goodwill extended into Europe, the Respondent's primary area of activity. When it filed the Complaint, it knew that the descriptive nature of its trademark called for cogent evidence to demonstrate that its trademark had acquired a reputation in Europe and that the Respondent used LEGALLY other than for its descriptive meaning. (This was of particular importance in Europe where its trademark protection is limited to a figurative mark.) The Complainant also knew that the Respondent was operating a genuine business by way of its website connected to the disputed domain name, a business for which the disputed domain name is appropriate.

The Complainant is represented by an experienced IP practitioner apparently closely associated with the Complainant given the following passage in the decision in WIPO Case No. [D2018-1958](#) supra:

*“Complainant states that since launching in 2015, all of the trademark services that customers receive through the Complainant’s platform are provided by or overseen by BreanLaw attorneys. Since advertising on the Complainant’s website, approximately 98% of BreanLaw’s trademark work has been sourced from the “www.legally.co” website. According to publicly available statistics, Breanlaw has worked on roughly 700 new matters a year since 2015, placing it in the top 25 of all U.S. trademark law firms by volume between 2015 and 2017.”*

The Complainant therefore had particular reason for knowing and understanding the importance of establishing targeting of the Complainant by way of cogent evidence and the particular difficulties arising from the highly descriptive nature of the Complainant’s trademark.

The Complaint was also partly misleading, giving the false impression that the Complainant’s current use of LEGALLY was for a legal document preparation system, when in fact the Complainant’s current use is only in respect of a United States trademark cease and desist letter preparation system (for the purpose of lead generation). This was corrected in the Supplemental Submission, after being raised by the Respondent in the Response.

In these circumstances, the Panel finds this to be a case of RDNH.

## **7. Decision**

For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is denied.

*/John Swinson/*  
**John Swinson**  
Presiding Panelist

*/Sally M. Abel/*  
**Sally M. Abel**  
Panelist

*/Tony Willoughby/*  
**Tony Willoughby**  
Panelist  
Date: April 29, 2026